INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS AND BAILOUTS*

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Abstract

We study how cross-country macroeconomic spillovers caused by sovereign default affect equilibrium bailouts. Because of portfolio diversification, the default of one country causes a macroeconomic contraction in countries that hold its debt, which could justify why a given country may want to bailout another. But why do creditor countries choose to bail out debtor countries instead of their own private sector? We show that this is because an external bailout could be cheaper than a domestic bailout. We also show that, although anticipated bailouts lead to higher borrowing, they can be Pareto improving not only ex-post (after a country has defaulted) but also ex-ante (before the country chooses its debt).

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1 Introduction

This paper is motivated by two observations related to sovereign debt markets. The first observation is that portfolio gross holdings are internationally diversified. Figure 1 illustrates this fact for Germany and for five European countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). The left panel plots the shares of public debt issued by Germany (solid line) and by the GIIPS countries (dashed line) held by non-resident banks. The right panel plots the shares of public debt issued by other European Union countries held by resident banks in Germany (solid line) and GIIPS countries (dashed line).

Figure 1: Sovereign debt and portfolio diversification. First panel: The solid line is the share of public debt issued by Germany that is held by banks that are non-resident of Germany. The dashed line is the share of public debt issued by GIIPS countries held by banks that are non-resident of the GIIPS countries. Data is from Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and the debt is measured as general government debt. Second panel: The solid line is the holdings of German banks of public debt issued by other EU countries over the total EU public debt held by German banks. The dashed line is the holdings of GIIPS banks of public debt issued by other EU countries over the total EU public debt held by GIIPS banks. Data is from Statistical Data Warehouse of the Bank of International Settlements, Balance Sheet Items and the variable in the numerator is “Holdings of debt securities issued by other EU Member States General Government reported by MFI (stock)”. For GIIPS countries, we first compute a series for each country and then we calculate the GDP-weighted average.

The figure shows that countries hold, at the same time, large shares of foreign liabilities (first panel) and large shares of foreign assets (second panel). The international diversification is not limited to public debt but it extends to private debt, portfolio investments, and FDI (Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007, 2017). In this paper, however, we focus on sovereign debt because of its special role in providing liquidity.

The second observation is that many episodes of sovereign debt crises are resolved with restructuring programs negotiated with creditor countries (bailouts). Figure
2, reconstructed from Mitchener and Trebesch (2021), shows that 75% of modern-era debt crises have been resolved without formal default, although they typically involve some form of financial assistance (bailout). For example, bailout episodes that succeeded in preventing default include those experienced by periphery countries in Europe (excluding Greece) during the 2011-2012 crisis. According to Gourinchas, Martin and Messer (2020), these transfers amounted to 3.6% of GDP for Cyprus, 1.29% for Ireland, 2.93% for Portugal, and 0.49% for Spain.

The fact that sovereign debt crises tend to be resolved with bailout programs raises two questions. First, why do creditor countries choose to bail out defaulting countries? Second, although bailouts could be welfare improving ex-post, are they welfare improving also ex-ante—that is, before countries choose how much to borrow? The goal of this paper is to address these questions.

The first result of this paper is to show that external bailouts could be cheaper than domestic bailouts, which explains why creditor countries may prefer an external bailout. Because of international financial diversification (Figure 1), default generates negative macroeconomic spillovers in creditor countries. These could be mitigated, or even averted, with either an external bailout (by transferring resources to the foreign governments) or with a domestic bailout (by helping domestic investors). Because an external bailout also brings macroeconomic benefits for the defaulting country, the same macroeconomic outcome can be achieved with a smaller external bailout than with a domestic bailout.

The second result of the paper is that external bailouts could be welfare improving not only ex-post, but also ex-ante. This may appear surprising since the anticipation of bailouts creates, typically, a moral hazard problem leading to higher indebtedness. However, when public debt provides liquidity (which is a feature of our model) and part of the debt is held abroad (also a feature of our model), countries might issue
too little debt. The anticipation of bailouts, then, could bring the equilibrium debt closer to the efficient level.

We show these results in a two-country model where both types of sovereign debt crises— with and without default—could arise in equilibrium. The model features cross-country holdings of debt issued by the two countries. Although international diversification may improve production efficiency and allow for greater risk-sharing, it also increases macroeconomic interdependence across countries. This implies that the macroeconomic impact of a crisis in one country spills over to the other country.

According to Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch (2013), cross-border feedback channels arise because banks and financial institutions are exposed to the sovereign default risks of other countries. For example, Rieffel (2003) shows that banks in the US were heavily exposed to emerging country debt during the 1980s. A 30% write-off of emerging country debt would have depleted the capital of most large US banks, creating unpredictable consequences for financial markets and the whole US economy. We capture the international interdependence by formalizing a consolidated bank/business sector that chooses optimally the holdings of domestic and foreign debt.

Public debt is a liquid asset that facilitates production. Default reduces the stock of debt and, therefore, generates negative macroeconomic consequences that spill to other countries due to cross-country holdings. A bailout is modelled as a Nash bargaining game between the government of the creditor country and the government of the defaulting country. The game determines a transfer made by the creditor country to the defaulting country in exchange for a higher debt repayment. This is similar to the debt restructuring mechanism studied in Yue (2010) and Bai and Zhang (2012), but with an endogenous threat value. Effectively, with a bailout program, creditor countries encourage debt repayment. By doing so, they reduce the financial losses experienced by domestic banks/businesses and alleviate the negative macroeconomic consequences caused by default. We refer to the transfer resulting from the bargaining game as an ‘external bailout.’

Creditor countries could also alleviate the negative macroeconomic consequences of default by directly bailing out its own banks/businesses rather than the defaulting country. This takes the form of a transfer to domestic entrepreneurs to cover, partially or in full, the financial losses incurred on their holdings of foreign debt. We refer to this transfer as a ‘domestic’ bailout. We show that, under some conditions, creditor countries prefer to bail out foreign governments rather than their own banks/businesses because the external bailout is cheaper than the domestic bailout.

To understand why, we have to consider that an external bailout reduces the macroeconomic losses in both countries. A domestic bailout, instead, reduces the losses only in the creditor country. Because the defaulting country also benefits from a higher repayment facilitated by the external bailout, the creditor country can extract part of that gain in the bargaining process. Another way to say this is that the external transfer needed to induce the same repayment to domestic entrepreneurs is smaller than the domestic transfer needed with a domestic bailout.

In a dynamic setting, the anticipation of bailouts increases the incentive to borrow
which, ex-post, would require larger bailouts. This is the typical moral hazard problem in international borrowing. In spite of this, however, external bailouts could be Pareto improving also ex-ante, that is, before the issuance of debt. This is because, with financial integration, the issuing country does not internalize the benefits that its debt brings to other countries. Anticipated bailouts, then, could act as a counter-balancing force for this externality because they increase the incentive to issue more debt. Cross-country diversification of portfolios is crucial for this result: in absence of diversification the benefits of public debt as well as the macroeconomic consequences of default would be fully internalized. We show that this result holds quantitatively in infinite horizon version of the model calibrated to European countries.

In addition, we simulate the model over the period 1999-2013 and show that its dynamics capture some of the salient features of the 2011-2012 European debt crisis. An interesting aspect of the European experience was the raising debt of Germany prior to the crisis. The simulation of the model shows that the increase in German debt, a safe asset, exacerbated the later crisis. As the safe country (Germany) issues more debt, part of the debt is purchased by the residents of the risky country (a representative country among the GIIPS). As a result, the risky country becomes more diversified. But higher diversification reduces the macroeconomic cost of default for the risky country, which increases the incentive to default. The higher incentive to default arises even if the debt issued by the risky country and the fraction held by foreigner residents does not change. This shows that a debt crisis in risky countries could be triggered, or amplified, by the financial expansion in creditor countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a discussion of the related literature, we describe the model in Section 2. We then define the competitive and political equilibrium in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 considers a one-period version of the model to illustrate analytically the main channels at play. Section 6 conducts the quantitative analysis with the infinite-horizon model calibrated to European countries. Section 7 concludes.

Related literature

Following the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), several contributions in the literature have studied the dynamics of sovereign default in the context of small open economy models. In those models, default does not generate macroeconomic costs for the creditor countries besides the lower repayment. Moreover, the macroeconomic cost is often exogenous. In our model, default creates endogenous macroeconomic costs in both, the debtor and creditor countries, because government

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1Examples include Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Aguiar and Amador (2016), Arellano (2008), Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010), and Yue (2010). Aguiar and Amador (2014) and Tomz and Wright (2013) provide earlier reviews of this literature, whereas the handbook chapters by Aguiar, Chatterjee, Cole and Stangebye (2016) and D’Erasmo, Mendoza, and Zhang (2016) provide a more recent discussion of the literature on sovereign default and sustainable public debt.
debt provides liquidity to the private sector of both countries.

The sovereign-bank nexus is studied in Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2014), Perez (2015), and Sosa-Padilla (2018). These papers also consider small open economies with an endogenous cost of default. However, their goal is not to study the international spillovers of sovereign defaults, which justifies the use of the small economy paradigm. An important contribution of our study, instead, is to show the relevance of macroeconomic spillovers generated by sovereign default using a model with ‘large’ open economies, in the spirit of Azzimonti, de Fracisco and Quadrini (2014). The consideration of large open economies with endogenous spillovers are important for understanding the optimality of bailouts.

Cross-country spillovers play an important role for the desirability of bailouts in Tirole (2015) and Gourinchas, Martin, and Messer (2020). Our work differs in two dimensions. First, we provide a micro-foundation for international spillovers which derive from ‘endogenous’ cross-country holdings of financial assets and the role that these assets play in production. Second, we show that ex-post bailouts could generate Pareto improvements ex-ante (i.e. before debt is issued) because they lead to more, not less borrowing. In our setup, the debt issued by one country is beneficial for the production of both countries, and this generates a positive externality in the issuance of the debt. In absence of policy coordination or anticipated bailouts, public debt is inefficiently low. In Tirole (2015), the benefits from borrowing are always internalized but the cost of default is not (because spillovers are exogenously given). This leads to over-issuance of debt in absence of bailouts.

Bolton and Jeanne (2011) also study a model with a safe and risky country. With financial integration, the issuance of public debt from the safe country is too low while the issuance from the risky country is too high. In our model, instead, also the risky country issues too little debt. Importantly, they find that the safe country always loses, ex ante, from fiscal integration (bailout), which is different from our finding. The different finding derives from the assumption that in our model the debt of the risky country also provides liquidity. Because the risky country does not internalize the liquidity benefit of its debt for the other country, the debt issuance is too low. The anticipation of bailouts corrects for this inefficiency.

Our results also differ from those in the doom-loop literature (Farhi and Tirole (2012, 2018), Cooper and Nikolov (2018), and Hur, Sosa-Padilla, and Yom (2021)). One of the findings of this literature is that bailouts generate excessive financial fragility and, hence, reduce welfare. The contribution of our paper is complementary, not alternative, to the doom-loop literature because we focus on the positive effects...
of anticipated bailouts (external and domestic) funded by creditor countries.\footnote{Bianchi (2016) finds that bailouts may be welfare-improving ex-ante in an environment where the risky government bails out its domestic private sector but does not consider default. Our work, instead, studies cross-country bailouts subject to sovereign risk. The optimality of central government bailouts of sub-national units is studied in Chari and Kehoe (2007), Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008), and Dovis and Kirpalani (2020). Dovis (2019), Fink and Scholl (2016), and Roch and Uhlig (2018) consider instead bailouts provided by international financial institutions.}

A special feature of our analysis is the emphasis on portfolio diversification in affecting default decisions. Importantly, the mechanism differs from the one emphasized in the literature where, typically, public debt is used for private consumption smoothing (e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) or Arellano (2008)). We show that international diversification increases the incentive of a country to default because the domestic macroeconomic cost is smaller when portfolios are diversified. This is different from (and additional to) the cross-country redistribution from foreign to domestic residents, which is common to many sovereign default models such as Amador (2003), Aguiar, Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath (2013), Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2009), and Mendoza and Yue (2012). Through this channel we are also able to study the importance of financial booms in creditor countries for the incentives and consequences of default in debtor countries. Our model also features internal redistribution of default from domestic agents that hold the debt to other domestic agents. In this respect our paper relates to D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016, 2021) who consider domestic default in an economy with heterogeneous agents.

\section{The model}

Time is discrete and the economy lasts for \( N \) periods (with \( N \) potentially being infinity). There are two large countries. The first country is characterized by a strong political system that guarantees commitment to repay debt obligations. We refer to the first country as ‘safe’ and denote it with superscript \( S \). The second country, instead, is characterized by weaker institutions which are less effective at disciplining politicians. As a result, the country may default on part or all of its debt obligations. We refer to the second country as ‘risky’ and denote it with superscript \( R \). In each country \( i \in \{S, R\} \) there are two types of atomistic agents: a measure \( \mu^i \) of workers and a measure \( \mu^i \) of entrepreneurs. The population size is \( 2\mu^i \).

\subsection{Workers}

Workers value consumption and leisure with lifetime utility

\[
\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=1}^{N} \beta^{t-1} \left\{ c^i_t - \frac{\nu}{1+\nu} (\ell^i_t)^{\frac{1+\nu}{\nu}} \right\}.
\]

\footnote{Bianchi (2016) finds that bailouts may be welfare-improving ex-ante in an environment where the risky government bails out its domestic private sector but does not consider default. Our work, instead, studies cross-country bailouts subject to sovereign risk. The optimality of central government bailouts of sub-national units is studied in Chari and Kehoe (2007), Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008), and Dovis and Kirpalani (2020). Dovis (2019), Fink and Scholl (2016), and Roch and Uhlig (2018) consider instead bailouts provided by international financial institutions.}
The variable $c^i_t$ is consumption, $\ell^i_t$ is the supply of labor, $0 < \beta < 1$ is the intertemporal discount factor, and $\nu > 0$ is the elasticity of the labor supply. Workers do not participate in financial markets, so their budget constraint is

$$c^i_t = w^i_t \ell^i_t - \frac{T^i_t}{\mu^i}.$$  

The variable $T^i_t/\mu^i$ denotes government lump-sum taxes paid by each worker (or transfers if negative), and $w^i_t$ is the wage rate. The assumption that workers cannot borrow simplifies the exposition but it is not essential. The solution to the worker’s problem provides the individual supply of labor as a function of the wage rate,

$$\ell^i_t = (w^i_t)^\nu.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

### 2.2 Entrepreneurs

We consider a consolidated banking/business sector, where each bank/firm is run by an entrepreneur. The lifetime utility of an entrepreneur in country $i$ is

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=1}^{N} \beta^{t-1} \ln(d^i_t),$$

where $d^i_t$ denotes consumption.

There is no market for contingent claims and the only assets traded by entrepreneurs are one-period government bonds. With internationally integrated financial markets, entrepreneurs can hold bonds issued by both countries. We denote by $b^{ji}_t$ the bonds issued by country $j \in \{S, R\}$ held by an entrepreneur residing in country $i \in \{S, R\}$. Therefore, the first superscript indicates the issuing country while the second superscript indicates the nationality of the holder. The price for bonds issued by country $j$ is $q^j_t$. Because the repayment of the debt of country $S$ could differ from the repayment of country $R$, their prices could differ, that is, $q^S_t \neq q^R_t$.

Entrepreneurs in country $i$ enter period $t$ with assets $b^{Si}_t$ and $b^{Ri}_t$. After default from country $R$, which arises at the beginning of the period before any other decision is made, the financial wealth of entrepreneurs could be smaller than its pre-default value. Denoting by $m^i_t$ the after-default wealth, default could make $m^i_t < b^{Si}_t + b^{Ri}_t$. The precise definition of $m^i_t$ will be provided below. For the moment, we just need to remember that default reduces entrepreneurs’ wealth.

A central feature of the model is that the financial wealth of entrepreneurs affects their production decision. We formalize this by assuming that entrepreneurs operate the production function

$$y^i_t = z^i_t (m^i_t)^\alpha (\ell^i_t)^{1-\alpha},$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

\footnote{We could allow workers to borrow up to a limit. As long as the interest rate is lower than the intertemporal discount rate—which will be the case in the general equilibrium of the calibrated model—workers will borrow up to the limit and the model would have similar properties.}
where \( m_i \) is their financial wealth after default, \( l_i \) is the input of labor, and \( z_i^t \in \{z_{\text{Low}}, z_{\text{High}}\} \) is an aggregate country-specific productivity shock. Productivity in each country follows a stationary Markov process and the realization \( z_i^t \) becomes known at the beginning of the period, before entrepreneurs choose the input of labor \( l_i^t \). The production function captures, in reduced form, the inter-dependence between the financial and production sectors based on the idea that financial wealth provides working capital complementary to labor. Production also implies a cost \( \phi m_i^t \). The cost increases with the production scale, captured by the input \( m_i^t \). We interpret this cost as depreciation of fixed capital.\(^6\)

Given the value of financial assets, \( m_i^t \), and the wage rate, \( w_i^t \), entrepreneurs choose the input of labor \( l_i^t \) to maximize gross profits,

\[
\max_{l_i^t} \left\{ z_i^t (m_i^t)^\alpha (l_i^t)^{1-\alpha} - w_i^t l_i^t \right\}.
\]

The solution to the maximization problem returns the input of labor,

\[
l_i^t = \left( \frac{(1-\alpha) z_i^t}{w_i^t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} m_i^t, \tag{3}
\]

which we can use to derive the entrepreneur’s gross profits and end-of period wealth,

\[
\pi_i^t = \alpha z_i^t \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha) z_i^t}{w_i^t} \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} m_i^t, \tag{4}
\]

\[
a_i^t = (1-\phi) m_i^t + \pi_i^t. \tag{5}
\]

The end-of-period wealth is in part consumed and in part saved in domestic and foreign bonds. The entrepreneur’s budget constraint is

\[
a_i^t = d_i^t + q_i^R b_i^R t_{i+1} + q_i^S b_i^S t_{i+1}.
\]

Denote by \( \delta_{t+1} \) the fraction of debt repaid by country \( R \) in the next period. When \( \delta_{t+1} = 1 \) the government fully repays its debt obligations. A value \( \delta_{t+1} < 1 \) indicates a partial default. This is an endogenous stochastic variable that will be derived in equilibrium. We refer to \( 1 - \delta_{t+1} \) as the haircut.\(^7\)

\(^6\)Suppose that each entrepreneur needs to use a fixed amount of physical capital \( \bar{k} \) in production. When production increases, the fixed capital is utilized more intensively which leads to higher depreciation. We could use an alternative specification in which the input of production is not financial wealth but it is physical capital, which is endogenously accumulated by firms. By further assuming that the utilization of capital requires working capital, we introduce a motive to hold financial wealth similar to the current specification. This alternative model would increase the complexity of the analytical exposition but would not change the basic properties characterized in the paper. We would also like to point out that the cost \( \phi m_i^t \) is only relevant for the calibration of the model, as we will see in the quantitative analysis, but it is irrelevant for the qualitative properties.

\(^7\)We allow for partial default which is a feature of the data. Although full default is more common in the literature, there are some exceptions like Arellano, Mateos-Planas and Rios-Rull (2019).
Entrepreneurs take the distribution of $\delta_{t+1}$ as given when solving their optimization problem. The portfolio decisions are characterized by the following lemma.

**Lemma 1** Entrepreneurs’ optimal consumption and portfolio decisions satisfy

\[
\begin{align*}
    d_t^i &= (1 - \bar{\beta}_t^i)a_t^i, \\
    q_t^S b_{t+1}^{S_i} &= \theta_t \bar{\beta}_t^i a_t^i, \\
    q_t^R b_{t+1}^{R_i} &= (1 - \theta_t) \bar{\beta}_t^i a_t^i,
\end{align*}
\]

where $\bar{\beta}_t = \frac{\beta - \beta^{N-t+1}}{1 - \beta^{N-t+1}}$ and $\theta_t$ solves the first order condition

\[
1 = E_t \left\{ \frac{\delta_{t+1}}{(1 - \theta_t)\delta_{t+1} + \theta_t q_t^R / q_t^S} \right\}. \tag{6}
\]

**Proof.** See Appendix A.

Entrepreneurs consume a fraction $1 - \bar{\beta}_t^i$ of their wealth $a_t^i$ and save the remaining fraction $\bar{\beta}_t^i$. A fraction $\theta_t$ of savings is then invested in bonds issued by the safe country and the remaining fraction $1 - \theta_t$ is invested in bonds issued by the risky country. Notice that $\theta_t$ does not have the country subscript $i$. This means that entrepreneurs in both countries choose the same composition of portfolios, that is, they allocate the same fraction of wealth to bonds issued by the two countries.

### 2.3 Governments and policies

The government of country $j$ enters the period with an aggregate stock of debt $B_t^j$, $j \in \{S, R\}$. The debt is in part held by entrepreneurs in country $S$ and in part by entrepreneurs in country $R$. Therefore,

\[
B_t^j = B_t^{jS} + B_t^{jR}.
\]

The variable $B_t^{ji} = b_t^i \mu^j$ is the total debt issued by country $j$ held by entrepreneurs in country $i$. We use capital letters to denote aggregate values. By summing the total holdings of both countries, $B_t^{jS}$ and $B_t^{jR}$, we obtain the total debt issued by country $j$, the variable $B_t^j$.

Country $S$ has strong political institutions that guarantee the commitment to always repay its debt obligations. In country $R$, instead, institutions are less effective and with probability $\rho^R$ its government can attempt to restructure the debt. Let $\varrho^R = 1$ be the state of the world in which country $R$ has commitment (repays the debt in full) and $\varrho^R = 0$ the state in which it has flexibility to default. This variable, which could be the result of political turnover, is realized at the beginning of the

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8The fraction $\bar{\beta}_t^i$ is time-specific because of the finite life span. With an infinite horizon $\bar{\beta}_t = \beta$. 

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period. When the risky country has flexibility, it can approach the creditor country to renegotiate its debt obligations, triggering a restructuring episode. If it chooses to do so, we say that country $R$ is in a ‘sovereign debt crisis.’ However, the request to restructure the debt might not succeed.

To capture the fact that some debt crises end up in straight default while others are resolved with some rescue package (see Figure 2), we assume that the safe country is able to renegotiate the debt and offer a bailout with probability $\rho^S$. With probability $1 - \rho^S$, instead, offering an external bailout is not politically feasible for country $S$. Therefore, if a debt crisis arises in country $R$, it will be resolved with default.

We denote with $\varrho^S = 1$ the state of the world in which country $S$ has the flexibility to offer a bailout to the risky country, and $\varrho^S = 0$ the state in which it cannot bail out the risky country. As for the commitment of country $R$ to repay, we interpret the ability of country $S$ to negotiate as reflecting the political environment that prevails in that country. Both $\varrho^R$ and $\varrho^S$ are revealed before country $R$ decides whether to trigger a restructuring episode.

The sequence of play is summarized in Figure 3 and the associated payoffs defined in Section 4. At the beginning of the period the states $\varrho^R$ and $\varrho^S$ become known and they determine the main branches of the tree drawn in the figure.

1. **First branch**: This is the case in which $\varrho^R = 1$. Country $R$ has full commitment to repay and, therefore, the realization of $\varrho^S$ is irrelevant.

2. **Second branch**: This is the case with $\varrho^R = 0$ and $\varrho^S = 0$. Country $R$ has two options: it can repay the debt or default without receiving a bailout (since country $S$ is unable to negotiate a bailout). If it chooses to default, the repayment $\delta_t$ is chosen unilaterally to maximize the welfare of country $R$. Country $S$, however, can bail out its own entrepreneurs (domestic bailout).

   With a domestic bailout, country $S$ makes transfers to domestic entrepreneurs by taxing domestic workers. The transfer received by an entrepreneur is proportional to the ‘individual’ wealth of the entrepreneur, that is, $\tilde{\tau}^d_t = \chi_t \left( B^{SS} + \delta_t b^{RS} \right)$.

   The average per-entrepreneur transfer is then

   $$\tau^d_t = \chi_t \left( \frac{B^{SS} + \delta_t B^{RS}}{\mu^S} \right).$$

   Since in equilibrium there is a representative entrepreneur, each will get the same transfer $\tau^d_t$. Still, the assumption that the transfers are proportional to individual entrepreneurs’ wealth, rather than the actual losses incurred by each entrepreneur, simplifies the portfolio decision.$^9$

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$^9$The alternative assumption would be that the transfer is equal to the actual loss incurred by the entrepreneur on the defaulted bond, that is, $\tilde{\tau}^d_t = (1 - \delta_t) b^{RS}_t$. Since in equilibrium entrepreneurs are homogeneous, the transfers they receive are still the same. However, the two assumptions imply different optimality conditions for the portfolio choice. In particular, under the alternative assump-
Figure 3: Sequence of events in debt restructuring, bailout and default.

The domestic transfer made by country $S$ cannot exceed the average losses,

$$
\tau_d \leq \frac{(1 - \delta_t) B_t^{RS}}{\mu^S}.
$$

3. **Third branch:** This is the case with $\phi^R = 0$ and $\phi^S = 1$. Country $R$ can ask for a restructuring and country $S$ has the ability to negotiate a bailout. Negotiation is over the repayment fraction $\delta_t$ and total transfers $\tau_t^e \mu^S$ from country $S$ to country $R$. We refer to the negotiated transfers as ‘external bailout’. If the negotiated repayment fraction $\delta_t$ is smaller than 1, country $S$ can also make a transfer $\tau^d \geq 0$ to its own entrepreneurs as described above (domestic bailout).

Governments in both countries balance their budget with taxes $T_t$.
negative) paid by workers. Their budget constraints are

\[ T_s^t + q_t^s B_{t+1}^s = B_t^s + (\tau_t^d + \tau_t^e) \mu^s, \]

\[ T_r^t + q_t^r B_{t+1}^r = \delta_t B_t^r - \tau_t^e \mu^s. \]

The budget constraints encompass all possible cases of 'no restructuring', 'restructuring without bailout', and 'restructuring with bailout'. In the case of no restructuring, country \( R \) fully repays its debt obligations. Thus, \( \delta_t = 1, \tau_t^d = 0 \) and \( \tau_t^e = 0 \). In the case of restructuring without bailout, there is a sovereign debt crisis with default where \( \delta_t < 1, \tau_t^d \geq 0 \) and \( \tau_t^e = 0 \). Recall that the safe country can always bail out its own entrepreneurs, so the term 'no bailout' refers to absence of 'external' bailout. In the case of restructuring with bailout, we have \( \delta_t \leq 1, \tau_t^d \geq 0 \) and \( \tau_t^e > 0 \).

Given the restructuring outcome, which is captured by the variables \( \delta_t, \tau_t^d \) and \( \tau_t^e \), individual entrepreneurs’ wealth in the two countries becomes

\[ m_t^s = b_t^{ss} + \delta_t b_t^{rs} + \tau_t^d, \]

\[ m_t^r = b_t^{sr} + \delta_t b_t^{rr}. \]

These expressions make clear how a default from country \( R \)—with or without external bailout—affects entrepreneurs wealth, which in turn affects aggregate macroeconomic activity. By choosing a lower repayment fraction \( \delta_t \), entrepreneurs’ wealth is reduced. The safe country \( S \), however, can alleviate the impact of default by implementing a domestic bailout with transfer \( \tau_t^d \) to each domestic entrepreneur.

In the event of default, country \( R \) is excluded from the market for only one period and \( B_{t+1}^r = \delta_t B_t^r \). Starting in the next period, however, the country re-enters the financial market and chooses the new debt optimally.

To simplify the analysis we abstract from the optimal choice of debt in country \( S \). Instead, we assume that the supply of safe assets is exogenous and change stochastically according to a first order Markov chain where \( B_t^s \) can take two values, \( B_{Low} \) and \( B_{High} \). A transition from \( B_{Low} \) to \( B_{High} \) captures a financial shock that increases the supply of safe assets.

### 2.4 Timing within a period

Before characterizing the equilibrium, it would be helpful to make the timing more precise. The sequence of events within each period \( t \) is illustrated in Figure 4. A period can be divided in three subperiods:

**Subperiod 1:** Debt restructuring with or without bailout takes place at the beginning of the period as illustrated in Figure 3. The exogenous states at the beginning-of-period include the aggregate productivity \( z_t^i \in \{z_{Low}, z_{High}\} \),
current and new bonds issued by the safe country, $B_t^S \in \{B_{Low}, B_{High}\}$ and $B_{t+1}^S \in \{B_{Low}, B_{High}\}$, and the commitment variables $\varrho_t^R$ and $\varrho_t^S$. For the later derivation of the spreads, it would be convenient to assume that $\varrho_t^R$ is observed before $\varrho_t^S$. Debt restructuring, however, takes place only after they both become known. The endogenous states at the beginning of the period (not shown in the figure) are the bonds issued by the risky country in the previous period, $B_t^R$, and the portfolio holdings of entrepreneurs, $b_t^{ij}$.

**Subperiod 2:** Given the post-default wealth, entrepreneurs choose the input of labor and workers choose the supply of labor. Clearing in the labor market determines the wage $w_{it}$ and employment $L_{it}$ in each country $i \in \{S, R\}$.

**Subperiod 3:** Entrepreneurs choose the portfolio allocation, $b_{t+1}^{Si}$ and $b_{t+1}^{Ri}$, which determines the demands for safe and risky debt. The government of country $R$ chooses the supply of debt $B_{t+1}^R$. In the event of default $B_{t+1}^R = \delta_t B_t^R$. Clearing in the bond market determines the prices for bonds, $q_t^S$ and $q_t^R$.

### 3 Competitive equilibrium

In this section, we characterize some of the properties of the competitive equilibrium for given government policies (restructuring, bailout, and debt issuance). Given the particular timing structure, we analyze separately the competitive equilibrium in the labor market and the competitive equilibrium in the financial market. We start with the labor market equilibrium, which we can characterize analytically.
3.1 Labor market equilibrium

Figure 5 shows the supply and demand for labor derived from the aggregation of individual supplies—eq. (1)—and individual demands—eq. (3).

\[
L_{si}^t = \mu^t (w_t)^\nu
\]

Labor supply

\[
L_{di}^t = \mu^t \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha)z_i^t}{w_t^i} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} m_i^t
\]

Labor demand

Figure 5: Labor Market Equilibrium.

The demand for labor is a function of entrepreneurs’ wealth \( m_i^t \). An increase in \( m_i^t \) shifts the demand for labor to the right and leads to higher employment and wage. Equivalently, a decrease in \( m_i^t \) shifts the demand for labor to the left, reducing equilibrium employment and wage. Through the impact on \( m_i^t \), the default of country \( R \) has real macroeconomic consequences in both countries.

The equilibrium wage is given by

\[
w_t^i = \left[ (1-\alpha)z_i^t \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\alpha}} (m_i^t)^{\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha}}. \tag{9}
\]

The wage rate is increasing in productivity \( z_i^t \) and financial wealth \( m_i^t \). Once we find the equilibrium wage, we can determine the individual supply of labor from workers \( \ell_i^t \) (eq. 1), the individual input of labor used in production by entrepreneurs \( l_i^t \) (eq. 3), individual profits \( \pi_i^t \) (eq. 4), and the end of period net worth \( a_i^t \) (eq. 5).

Aggregation of individual production from all entrepreneurs allows us to derive aggregate gross output \( Y_t^i = y_t^i \mu^i \). Using the individual production function eq. (2), we can express aggregate production as

\[
Y_t^i = (1-\alpha)^{\frac{\nu(1-\alpha)}{1+\alpha}} (z_i^t)^{\frac{1+\alpha}{\nu(1+\alpha)}} (m_i^t)^{\frac{\nu(1+\alpha)}{1+\alpha}} \mu^i. \tag{10}
\]

Eq. (10) shows that a reduction in \( m_i^t \) caused by default has a negative impact on aggregate production in each country. The model, thus, generates endogenous macroeconomic spillovers from default. In other models such as Tirole (2015), instead, the spillovers are exogenous.
Another feature of the model is that the contraction induced by default is larger during economic booms. This is stated formally in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2** The drop in output $Y^i_t$ in country $i \in \{S, R\}$ induced by default is larger when the productivity of country $i$ is high, that is,

$$\frac{\partial Y^i_t(z^i_t = z_{High})}{\partial \delta_t} > \frac{\partial Y^i_t(z^i_t = z_{Low})}{\partial \delta_t}. \quad (11)$$

**Proof.** It follows from the derivative of $Y^i_t$ with respect to $\delta_t$, where aggregate output is defined in eq. (10) and $m^i_t$ is defined in eq. (8).

This property has two implications: (i) the incentive of the risky country to default increases when the country is in recession; (ii) the bailout incentive of the safe country increases when the country is in an economic boom. While the first implication (higher default incentive in recession) is a feature of many sovereign default models, the second (bailout incentive) is a novel feature of our model. It points out that the business cycle is important not only for the incentive to default but also for bailouts.

### 3.2 Financial market equilibrium

We now characterize the financial market’s equilibrium, which requires that the demands for bonds must be equal to their supplies,

$$B_{t+1}^{SS} + B_{t+1}^{SR} = B_t^S, \quad (12)$$
$$B_{t+1}^{RS} + B_{t+1}^{RR} = B_t^R. \quad (13)$$

The aggregation of individual portfolio decisions characterized in Lemma 1 provides the entrepreneurs’ demands for safe bonds,

$$B_{t+1}^{SS} = \frac{\theta_t \bar{\beta}_t a^S_t \mu^S}{q_t^S}, \quad (14)$$
$$B_{t+1}^{SR} = \frac{\theta_t \bar{\beta}_t a^R_t \mu^R}{q_t^S}, \quad (15)$$

and entrepreneurs’ demands for risky bonds,

$$B_{t+1}^{RS} = \frac{(1 - \theta_t) \bar{\beta}_t a^S_t \mu^S}{q_t^R}, \quad (16)$$
$$B_{t+1}^{RR} = \frac{(1 - \theta_t) \bar{\beta}_t a^R_t \mu^R}{q_t^R}. \quad (17)$$

Entrepreneurs consume a fraction $1 - \bar{\beta}_t$ of their wealth $a^i_t$ and save the remaining fraction $\bar{\beta}_t$. A fraction $\theta_t$ of savings is then invested in safe bonds, and the remaining fraction $1 - \theta_t$ in risky bonds. The fraction $\theta_t$, determined by condition (6), is
independent of \( i \) because entrepreneurs in both countries choose the same portfolio composition. The variable \( a^i_t = (1 - \phi)m^i_t + \pi^i_t \) is the individual end-of-period net worth of entrepreneurs in country \( i \) and the aggregate net worth is \( a^i_t \mu^i \).

Given the end-of-period net worth, \( a^S_t \) and \( a^R_t \), and the aggregate supplies of bonds, \( B^S_{t+1} \) and \( B^R_{t+1} \), we can use eqs. (6) and (12)-(17) to find the equilibrium values of \( B^S_{t+1}, B^S_{t+1}, B^R_{t+1}, q^S_t, q^R_t, \theta_t \). Because \( \theta_t \) depends on the repayment fraction \( \delta_{t+1} \), which depends non-linearly on the next period states, to find a solution we need to know the mapping that relates \( \delta_{t+1} \) to future individual and government choices, as well as future realizations of the exogenous shocks. This complex dependence does not allow us to find an analytical solution for \( \delta_{t+1} \). We will then solve for the financial market equilibrium numerically.

4 Political equilibrium

To use a compact notation, we denote by \( \mathbf{p}_t = (\delta_t, \tau_d^i, \tau_e^i) \) the outcome of debt restructuring. The vector \( \mathbf{p}_t \), together with the new debt chosen by the risky country, \( B^R_{t+1} \), represent the policy variables that are determined in the political equilibrium.

We consider only government policies that have a Markov structure, that is, they are functions of the aggregate states \( \mathbf{s}_t = (z^S_t, z^R_t, B^S_{t+1}, B^R_{t+1}, \delta^S_t, \delta^R_t, \theta_t) \). The state vector includes \( B^S_{t+1} \) since the debt issued by the safe country follows a Markov process and new borrowing is revealed at the beginning of the period. The policy variables can be expressed as

\[
\mathbf{p}_t = \Upsilon_t(\mathbf{s}_t),
B^R_{t+1} = \Phi_t(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{p}_t).
\]

Given the policy functions, the government’s value in country \( i \) can be written as

\[
V^i_t(\mathbf{s}_t) = U^i(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{p}_t, B^R_{t+1}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t V^i_{t+1}(\mathbf{s}_{t+1}),
\]

where \( U^i(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{p}_t, B^R_{t+1}) \) is the period utility defined as

\[
U^i(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{p}_t, B^R_{t+1}) = \Psi \cdot \ln \left[ (1 - \phi)m^i_t + \pi^i_t - q^S_t \delta^S_t - q^R_t \delta^R_t \right] + (1 - \Psi) \cdot \left[ w^i \ell^i_t - \frac{T^i_t}{\mu^i} - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu \left( \ell^i_t \right)^{1+\nu}} \right] = \lambda \frac{B^i_{t+1}}{\mu^i}.
\]

This is the weighted sum of utilities of entrepreneurs and workers, weighted by \( \Psi \) and \( 1 - \Psi \). Note that the expression is written in ‘per-entrepreneur’ terms (e.g. we have divided the total welfare by the mass of \( \mu^i \) of entrepreneurs and workers). In addition, we have assumed that the stock of debt \( B^i_{t+1} \) has a negative impact on government’s welfare. This cost, which in reduced form reflects political risks associated with excessive borrowing, does not play any significant role for the qualitative properties of the model. We included it only for calibration purposes.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\)As we will see in the quantitative analysis, with the calibration of \( \lambda \) we will be able to match the debt-to-GDP ratio together with the risk-free interest rate.
Given the states $s_t$, and the governments’ policies $p_t$ and $B_{t+1}^R$, the period utility $U^i(s_t, p_t, B_{t+1}^R)$ can be derived analytically. However, the continuation value can only be computed numerically. Notice that the value function $V^i_t(s_t)$ has the $t$ subscript because time could be finite. The subscript can be omitted when $N = \infty$.

When the governments of the two countries solve their optimization problems at time $t$, they take as given the continuation value $V^i_{t+1}(s_{t+1})$, in addition to the policy responses of the other government. The future impact of their current policies are fully captured by the impact on the next period states $s_{t+1}$. Given the timing structure illustrated in Figure 4, we describe first the optimal borrowing choice of country $R$ given the debt restructuring outcome (e.g. the decisions made in the last sub-period). We will then describe the debt restructuring problem given the anticipated borrowing policy.

4.1 Borrowing policy

The government of country $R$ solves the problem

$$V^R_t(s_t, p_t) = \max_{B_{t+1}^R} \left\{ U^R(s_t, p_t, B_{t+1}^R) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^R_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) \right\}$$

subject to:

$$B_{t+1}^R = \delta_t B_t^R \quad \text{if} \quad p_t \neq (1, 0, 0)$$

where $V^R_{t+1}(s_{t+1})$ is the continuation value defined in (18). The government takes as given the default and renegotiation outcome $p_t$ since this is determined in subperiod 1. If country $R$ has restructured the debt, that is, $p_t \neq (1, 0, 0)$, it will not be able to re-optimize its borrowing and the new debt is $B_{t+1}^R = \delta_t B_t^R$. The difference between $V^R_t(s_t, p_t)$ and $V^R_{t+1}(s_t)$ is that the former is conditional on a given restructuring policy $p_t$ (which we have to find), while in the latter the equilibrium $p_t$ has already been substituted out. This will become clear below.

The solution to the above problem returns the borrowing policy $B_{t+1}^R = \Phi_t(s_t, p_t)$. The government’s value in country $S$ is

$$V^S_t(s_t, p_t) = U^S(s_t, p_t, \Phi_t(s_t, p_t)) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^S_{t+1}(s_{t+1}).$$

4.2 Restructuring policies

We now have all the ingredients to characterize default, renegotiation, and bailout policies, $p_t = \Upsilon_t(s_t)$. To do so we need to consider three possible scenarios: a) Full repayment; b) Debt restructuring without external bailout (default); c) Debt restructuring with external bailout.
a) Full repayment

Full repayment arises in two cases. The first is when country $R$ has full commitment to repay ($\varrho^R_t = 1$). This is the first branch of the tree depicted in Figure 3. The second is when country $R$ does not have the commitment to repay ($\varrho^R_t = 0$) but it does not find optimal to restructure the debt. This is captured by the second and third branches in Figure 3.

With full repayment, we have $p_t = (1, 0, 0)$: the repayment fraction is $\delta_t = 1$, and there are not bailout transfers, $\tau^d = \tau^e = 0$. The country’s welfare is

$$\mathcal{V}^i_t(s_t) = \mathcal{V}^i_t\left(s_t, (1, 0, 0)\right),$$

with $\mathcal{V}^i_t(s_t, p_t)$ defined in eqs. (19) and (20).

b) Debt restructuring without bailout (default)

In this scenario, country $R$ finds it optimal to restructure the debt. However, either country $S$ is unable to negotiate ($\varrho^S_t = 0$) or, even if the country is able to negotiate ($\varrho^S_t = 1$), it does not find it optimal. The first case could arise in the second branch of Figure 3. The second case could arise in the third branch. In both cases $\tau^e = 0$. However, country $S$ can still implement a domestic bailout, $\tau^d > 0$.

The two governments make their choices sequentially: Country $R$ chooses the repayment $\delta_t$ first and country $S$ chooses $\tau^d_t$ knowing the value of $\delta_t$. They play a Stackelberg game where country $R$ is the leader and country $S$ is the follower.

We solve the strategic game starting with the optimization problem solved by country $S$ (the follower). After country $R$ has chosen the repayment fraction $\delta_t$, the optimal domestic transfer chosen by the safe country is

$$g^\tau_t(s_t, \delta_t) = \arg\max_{\tau^d_t \in [0, 1-\delta_t]B^{RS}/\mu^v} \mathcal{V}^S_t\left(s_t, (\delta_t, \tau^d_t, 0)\right).$$

The constraint imposes that the individual domestic transfer is non-negative and does not exceed the average losses incurred by each entrepreneur.

Country $R$ chooses the optimal repayment fraction $\delta_t$ taking as given the response function $g^\tau(s_t, \delta_t)$ of the safe country. The optimal $\delta_t$ solves

$$g^\delta_t(s_t) = \arg\max_{\delta_t \in [0, 1]} \mathcal{V}^R_t\left(s_t, \left(\delta_t, g^\tau_t(s_t, \delta_t), 0\right)\right).$$

Using the optimal policies chosen by the two countries, the value for country $i$ is

$$\mathcal{V}^i_t(s_t) = \mathcal{V}^i_t\left(s_t, \left(g^\delta_t(s_t), g^\tau_t\left(s_t, g^\delta_t(s_t)\right), 0\right)\right).$$
c) Debt restructuring with bailout

If country \( R \) chooses to restructure the debt and country \( S \) has the ability to negotiate a bailout \((\varphi^S = 1)\), the restructuring outcome \( p_t = (\delta_t, \tau^d_t, \tau^e_t) \) is determined with Nash bargaining. If bargaining fails, the countries revert to the equilibrium with restructuring but without bailout (default). Therefore, the threat values are \( V_t^S(s_t) \) and \( V_t^R(s_t) \) defined above.

Given \( \eta \), the bargaining power of country \( S \), the restructuring outcome solves\(^{11} \)

\[
 g^P_t(s_t) = \arg\max_{\delta_t, \tau^d_t, \tau^e_t} \left[ V_t^S(s_t, (\delta_t, \tau^d_t, \tau^e_t)) - V_t^S(s_t) \right]^{\eta} \left[ V_t^R(s_t, (\delta_t, \tau^d_t, \tau^e_t)) - V_t^R(s_t) \right]^{1-\eta},
\]

subject to:

\[
\begin{align*}
\delta_t &\in [0, 1] \\
\tau^d_t &\in \left[ 0, \frac{(1 - \delta_t)B_t^{RS}}{\mu^S} \right] \\
\tau^e_t &\geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Using the negotiated policy \( g^P_t(s_t) \), we define the value for country \( i \) as

\[
 V^i_t(s_t) = V_t^i\left(s_t, g^P_t(s_t)\right)
\]

The solution obtained in the case of debt restructuring without bailout (default) is also feasible in the negotiation problem considered here. Therefore, an external bailout always (weakly) dominates a debt restructuring without bailout. This implies that \( V^i_t(s_t) \geq V^i_t(s_t) \). Thus, a domestic bailout without renegotiation never strictly dominates an external bailout.

After deriving the value functions associated with debt restructuring (with and without bailout), we can determine whether country \( R \) prefers to repay or restructure the debt. This is the decision made when \( g^R_t = 0 \), which arises in the second and third branches of Figure 3. The optimal decision—denoted by \( \xi_t(s_t) \)—solves

\[
 \xi_t(s_t) = \arg\max_{x \in \{0, 1\}} \begin{cases} 
 x \cdot V_t^R(s_t) + (1 - x) \cdot V_t^R(s_t), & \text{if } g^S_t = 0, \\
 x \cdot V_t^R(s_t) + (1 - x) \cdot V_t^R(s_t), & \text{if } g^S_t = 1.
\end{cases}
\]

Given the restructuring policy \( \xi_t(s_t) \), we can compute the associated welfare as

\[
 V^i_t(s_t) = \begin{cases} 
 \xi_t(s_t) \cdot V^i_t(s_t) + (1 - \xi_t(s_t)) \cdot V^i_t(s_t), & \text{if } g^S_t = 0, \\
 \xi_t(s_t) \cdot V^i_t(s_t) + (1 - \xi_t(s_t)) \cdot V^i_t(s_t), & \text{if } g^S_t = 1.
\end{cases}
\]

\(^{11}\)Even though the two countries have different populations \( 2\mu_i \), we can write the Nash bargaining problem using ‘per-entrepreneur’ surpluses. Aggregate surpluses would give exactly the same result.
This is the value function for the government welfare we used in eq. (18).

5 One-period economy \((N = 1)\)

We start the characterization of the political equilibrium focusing on the special version of the model with only one period, that is, \(N = 1\). This is also the equilibrium in the terminal period of the multi-period model \((N > 1)\). With only one period, new borrowing is zero.\(^{12}\) The optimal policies, then, are limited to default and renegotiation, which we can characterize analytically.

Since there is only one period, we eliminate time subscripts and concentrate on the case with \(\vartheta^R = 0\), that is, country \(R\) has no commitment to repay. The equilibrium with commitment is trivial. We distinguish the case in which country \(S\) cannot renegotiate \((\vartheta^S = 0)\) in Subsection 5.1, from the case in which it has the ability to negotiate an external bailout \((\vartheta^S = 1)\), in Section 5.2. After characterizing the equilibrium in these two instances, we ask whether country \(S\) prefers an external bailout over a more direct domestic bailout (Subsection 5.3).

Given the states \(s = (z^S, z^R, B^{SS}, B^{SR}, B^{RS}, B^{RR})\), governments’ policies are \(p = (\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e)\), that is, the repayment and bailout variables which are determined by the sequential game depicted in Figure 3. The government’s objectives are defined by eqs. (19) and (20) but with the next period debts set to zero, that is, \(B_{N+1}^{S} = B_{N+1}^{R} = 0\). Since the parameter \(\phi\) does not affect the qualitative properties of the model, for the analysis of this section we assume that \(\phi = 0\). We can then rewrite the objective function for country \(i\) as

\[
V^i(s, p) = \Psi \cdot \ln \left[ m^i + y^i - w^i l^i \right] + (1 - \Psi) \cdot \left[ w^i l^i - \frac{T^i}{\mu^i} - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} \left( \ell^i \right)^{\frac{1+\nu}{\nu}} \right]. \quad (26)
\]

This is the (per-capita) weighted sum of utilities for entrepreneurs and workers. Entrepreneurs’ utility is increasing in individual consumption, which in the one-period model is equal to their end-of-period wealth \(a^i = m^i + \pi^i\). The welfare of workers is equal to consumption net of the dis-utility from working. Appendix B derives the analytical expression for the government’s welfare as a function of \(\delta, \tau^d\) and \(\tau^e\).

5.1 Debt restructuring without bailout (default)

When the safe country cannot negotiate an external bailout, the transfer \(\tau^e\) is zero. Since the repayment decision of country \(R\) does not depend on \(\tau^d\), we characterize the repayment fraction \(\delta\) ignoring the optimal choice of the domestic bailout.\(^{13}\)

\(^{12}\)This implies that the dis-utility capturing the political risk of debt is also zero.

\(^{13}\)The independence of the repayment from the domestic bailout of country \(S\) does not apply to the multi-period model because \(\tau^d\) affects savings and, therefore, the equilibrium interest rates.
Country \( R \) chooses \( \delta \in [0, 1] \) in order to maximize objective (26), subject to \( m^R = (B^{SR} + \delta B^{RR})/\mu^R \) and \( T^R = \delta B^R \). To characterize the solution, we consider first the unconstrained problem where the repayment ratio \( \delta \) is not constrained between zero and one. The unconstrained first order condition can be written as

\[
- \Psi \left( \frac{1}{d^R} \right) \left( \frac{\partial y^R}{\partial m^R} - w^R \frac{\partial l^R}{\partial m^R} \right) \left( \frac{B^{RR}}{B^R} \right) - (1 - \Psi) \left( w^R - \ell^R \right) \frac{\partial \ell^R}{\partial m^R} \left( \frac{B^{RR}}{B^R} \right) + 1 + \Psi \left( \frac{1}{d^R} \right) \left( \frac{B^{RR}}{B^R} \right) + 1 - \Psi = 0
\]

1. **Macroeconomic effect**

2. **Price effect**

3. **Redistribution effect**

This condition shows the marginal welfare effect for country \( R \) when its debt is reduced by one unit per entrepreneur/worker. This requires \( \delta \) to drop by \( \mu^R/B^R \).

The welfare effect is the sum of three components, each capturing the impact of a particular channel. We can also see the impact of each channel separately on entrepreneurs (terms multiplied by \( \Psi \)) and workers (terms multiplied by \( 1 - \Psi \)).

1. **Macroeconomic effect**: A lower repayment decreases the financial wealth of each entrepreneur, \( m^R = \delta b^{RR} + b^{SR} \), which in turn decreases the demand for labor, \( l^R \). Since both \( m^R \) and \( l^R \) are inputs of production, output \( y^R \) will also decrease. For entrepreneurs, the drop in output lowers profits and, therefore, consumption. Notice that the terms corresponding to entrepreneurs are multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption, \( 1/d^R \). For workers it decreases labor income but also the dis-utility of working.

2. **Price effect**: Lower entrepreneurs’ wealth reduces the demand for labor and causes a reduction in wages. This is captured by the term \( \partial w^R/\partial m^R \), which is positive for entrepreneurs (since it decreases the cost of labor) and negative for workers (since it reduces their labor compensation).

3. **Redistribution effect**: By repaying less, the government redistributes wealth from creditors (entrepreneurs) to tax payers (workers).\(^{14}\) Lowering \( B^R \) by one unit per entrepreneur/worker, decreases the wealth of entrepreneurs in country \( R \) by \( B^{RR}/B^R \). The welfare impact on workers is the reduction in taxes, which

\(^{14}\)The assumption that only workers pay taxes is not essential. This would be true even if taxes were equally paid by workers and entrepreneurs. What matters is that taxes are not proportional to the holding of the debt so that agents who hold the debt (entrepreneurs) experience a net gain from taxes while agents who do not hold the debt (workers) experience a net loss.
is equal to 1. As long as some of the bonds issued by country $R$ are held by foreign entrepreneurs, the wealth losses incurred by entrepreneurs are smaller than the reduction in taxes for workers, that is, $B_{RR} < 1$.

Although the redistribution effect of a lower repayment has positive welfare effects for workers, the macroeconomic and price effects have negative consequences for them. Thus, from the perspective of workers, default implies a trade-off: the benefit is the reduction in taxes while the cost is the reduction in income. From the perspective of entrepreneurs, instead, default implies only a cost: in addition to the direct loss of financial wealth, entrepreneurs also earn lower incomes (profits decline even if entrepreneurs pay lower wages). But the key insight is that the macroeconomic cost is lower when domestic portfolios are diversified, that is, $B_{RR}/B_R$ is smaller. As we can see, most of the terms in eq. (27) are multiplied by $B_{RR}/B_R$.

The next step is to establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and to characterize its properties. Let’s first define $\sigma^S$ and $\sigma^R$ as the shares of debt issued by country $S$ and country $R$, respectively, held by entrepreneurs in country $R$,

$$B_{SR} = \sigma^S B^S,$$
$$B_{RR} = \sigma^R B^R.$$

**Proposition 3** There exists a unique solution to the unconstrained problem with the optimal repayment rate $\delta^u(s)$ strictly increasing in productivity $z^R$. Keeping the portfolio shares $\sigma^S$ and $\sigma^R$ constant, $\delta^u(s)$ is strictly decreasing in $B^S$ and $B^R$.

**Proof.** Appendix C.

The first part of the proposition establishes that it is optimal to repay more when productivity is high. This property follows from the fact that the macroeconomic impact of default rises with productivity (see previous Proposition 2).

The second part of the proposition links the incentive to repay to the stocks of domestic and foreign debt. When there is more debt issued by either country, the incentive to repay declines. This property relies on the assumption that the portfolio shares $\sigma^S$ and $\sigma^R$ do not change. This would be the case if entrepreneurs in both countries choose the same composition of portfolio, that is, $(B^{SS}/B^{RS}) = (B^{SR}/B^{RR})$. This condition is consistent with the optimal choices characterized in Lemma 1 for the the multi-period model.

That an increase in $B^R$ leads to a lower repayment ratio may not be surprising, since a lower repayment generates a larger redistribution from foreign workers to domestic workers. More interesting is the dependence on $B^S$. A higher value of $B^S$ means that entrepreneurs in country $R$ hold more safe assets and, therefore, the macroeconomic cost of default is smaller.  

\[\text{15}\text{It is worth noting that the repayment rate is also decreasing in } \sigma^S \text{ and } \sigma^R \text{ until it reaches zero.}\]
The optimal repayment characterized in Proposition 3 is unconstrained. This means that $\delta_u(s)$ could be negative or bigger than 1, in which case the actual solution is at a corner, either 0 or 1. We can then express the optimal repayment ratio as

$$g^\delta(s) = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \delta_u(s), 0 \right\}, 1 \right\}$$ (28)

Figure 6 illustrates graphically the properties of the optimal repayment policy characterized in the proposition. The figure plots $g^\delta(s)$ as a function of $B^R$, that is, the stock of debt issued by country $R$. The two lines are for two different values of the safe debt $B^S$, and for a given level of productivity $z^R$. In changing $B^S$ and $B^R$ we keep the shares $\sigma^S$ and $\sigma^R$ constant. Focusing on the continuous line, which is associated with $B^S_{Low}$, the $R$ government fully repays its debt for values that are smaller than the threshold $\hat{B}^R_{Low}$. However, when the debt exceeds $\hat{B}^R_{Low}$, only a fraction is repaid. The country partially defaults and the debt haircut is positive.

**Figure 6:** Optimal repayment rate $\delta$ as a function of risky debt, $B^R$, for a given productivity $z^R$ and constant shares $\sigma^S$ and $\sigma^R$. The continuous line is for a low value of the safe debt, $B^S_{Low}$. The dashed line is for a high value of the safe debt, $B^S_{High}$.

**Portfolio diversification and externally induced default.** Figure 6 also illustrates the importance of portfolio diversification in country $R$. When country $S$ increases its debt to $B^S_{High}$, entrepreneurs in country $R$ hold more of the safe debt and, therefore, they become more diversified. This increases the incentive of country $R$ to default as illustrated by the change of the repayment function from the continuous line to the dashed line. The threshold above which the repayment is partial ($\delta < 1$) decreased from $\hat{B}^R_{Low}$ to $\hat{B}^R_{High}$. Furthermore, for any value of the debt above $\hat{B}^R_{High}$, the repayment ratio becomes smaller, before reaching the value of zero.
The comparison of the continuous line with the dashed line, for a given \( B^R \), isolates the portfolio channel emphasized in this paper from the ‘standard’ channel widely studied in the literature: if more of the risky debt is held by country \( S \) entrepreneurs, default becomes more attractive for country \( R \) because it generates a larger redistribution from residents of country \( S \) to residents of country \( R \). The mechanism discussed here, instead, is different because it keeps the debt of country \( R \) and its cross-country holdings fixed.

The importance of the diversification channel is to highlight that a country’s default could be driven or amplified by the increase in debt issued by other countries. The size of the haircut (for a given level of risky debt) increases with the level of safe assets held by residents of country \( R \). This will be also highlighted in the calibration exercise where we show that the expansion of the financial sector in safe countries (like Germany) impacts the incentives to default of risky countries (like the GIIPS).

Although in the model we only allow for financial assets issued by governments, the effect described here could also be driven by the expansion of private borrowing. For example, a financial boom in advanced economies, either private or public, could induce the default of emerging countries even if financial and real conditions have not changed in these countries. It could also be the result of an increase in global assets that are not controlled domestically, such as foreign currency or gold. It is in this sense that default could be ‘externally’ driven.

b) Domestic bailout decision by country \( S \)

Default by the risky country also destroys entrepreneurial wealth held by foreign entrepreneurs and, therefore, it affects adversely employment and output in country \( S \). To alleviate the negative macroeconomic spillover, the government of the safe country could bail out its own entrepreneurs.

With domestic bailout, country \( S \) chooses \( \tau^d \in [0, (1 - \delta)B^{RS}/\mu^S] \) to maximize (26) subject to \( m^S = (B^{SS} + \delta B^{RS})/\mu^S + \tau^d \) and \( T^S = B^S + \tau^d \mu^S \). The domestic transfer \( \tau^d \) is constrained to be non-negative and it cannot be bigger than the financial losses incurred by entrepreneurs when \( \delta < 1 \).

The first order condition with respect to \( \tau^d \) for the unconstrained problem is

\[
\Psi \left( \frac{1}{d^S} \right) \left( \frac{\partial y^S}{\partial m^S} - w^S \frac{\partial l^S}{\partial m^S} \right) + (1 - \Psi) \left( w^S - (t^S)^{\frac{1}{\nu}} \right) \frac{\partial l^S}{\partial m^S}
\]

1. Macroeconomic effect

\[
-\Psi \left( \frac{1}{d^S} \right) t^S \frac{\partial w^S}{\partial m^S} + (1 - \Psi) t^S \frac{\partial w^S}{\partial m^S} + \Psi \left( \frac{1}{d^S} \right) - (1 - \Psi) = 0
\]

2. Price effect

3. Redistribution effect
The welfare consequences of a domestic bailout are also decomposed into: the macroeconomic effect (reduces the size of the recession induced by default), the price effect (higher wages), and the redistribution effect (from workers to entrepreneurs).

Comparing the optimality condition for default from country $R$—eq. (27)—to the optimality condition for domestic bailout by country $S$—eq. (29)—we can see that the effects are similar but with an inverted sign, indicating that the domestic bailout is ‘undoing’ the effects of default. The only difference is that the various effects in eq. (27) are multiplied by $B_{RR}/B_R$, with the exception of the second term in the ‘redistribution effect’. The term $B_{RR}/B_R$ captures the importance of portfolio diversification which is not relevant for domestic bailouts.

**Proposition 4** Given $\delta$ chosen by country $R$, there exists a unique solution to the unconstrained domestic bailout problem with the optimal transfer $\tau^d(s;\delta)$ strictly increasing in productivity $z^S$. Furthermore, keeping the portfolio shares $\sigma^S$ and $\sigma^R$ constant, the transfer $\tau^d(s;\delta)$ strictly decreases in $B^S$, $B^R$ and $\delta$.

**Proof.** Appendix D.

As before, the constrained solution could be at a corner, so it can be written as

$$g^\tau(s,\delta) = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \tau^d(s;\delta), 0 \right\}, \frac{(1-\delta)B^{RS}}{\mu^S} \right\}. \quad (30)$$

**Figure 7:** Domestic bailout transfer $\tau^d$ as function of $\delta$. The plots are constructed keeping $\sigma^S$, $\sigma^R$ and $B^S$ constant.

Figure 7 illustrates the optimal domestic transfer $g^\tau(s,\delta)$ as a function of $\delta$. The left panel considers a value of $B^R$ that is relatively low. This is a situation in which there is scarcity of financial assets. Because of this, the government of country $S$ fully
compensates the losses incurred by domestic entrepreneurs with bailout transfers. Thus, the domestic transfer declines with the repayment ratio $\delta$. The right panel considers a value of $BR$ that is higher.\footnote{The threshold value at which we are in each case can be characterized analytically.} Provided that the debt of country $R$ is fully repaid, the financial wealth held by domestic entrepreneurs exceeds what is considered optimal by the $S$ government. This implies that, if country $R$ repays only part of its debt, the government of country $S$ does not fully bail out domestic entrepreneurs. As we can see in the second panel of Figure 7, the domestic transfer declines faster with the repayment ratio and becomes zero before $\delta$ reaches 1. In general, we can say that domestic transfers are weakly increasing in the losses of domestic entrepreneurs.

5.2 Debt restructuring with bailout

Without a rescue package from the safe country—which is the case analyzed in the previous subsection—the government of country $R$ ignores the macroeconomic cost of default incurred by country $S$. The equilibrium, then, may not be socially efficient and both countries could gain by renegotiating the repayment of debt.

Renegotiation arises only if country $R$ triggers a debt crisis, that is, if it asks for a debt restructuring and country $S$ is able to renegotiate ($\varrho_S = 1$). In this case, the governments of the two countries solve the Nash bargaining problem defined in eq. (24). The choice variables are the repayment rate $\delta \in [0, 1]$, the domestic transfer $\tau_d \in [0, (1-\delta)BR/\mu_S]$, and the external transfer $\tau_e \geq 0$. If the two countries do not reach an agreement, they revert to the equilibrium without external bailout. The threat values are $\overline{V}(s)$, defined in Section 5.1.

We start with the characterization of the bargaining problem when the choice variables are unconstrained. The first order condition with respect to $\tau_d$ is identical to the one derived in Section 5.1, eq. (29). This is because the domestic bailout only affects the welfare of residents in country $S$. Thus, given the repayment $\delta$, the optimal domestic transfer is identical to the one without bailout.

The first order condition with respect to the external transfer $\tau_e$ is

$$\frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} = \left[ \frac{V^S(s, p) - \overline{V}^S(s)}{V^R(s, p) - \overline{V}^R(s)} \right] \frac{\mu^S}{\mu^R}. \quad (31)$$

The term in parenthesis is the ratio of the net bargaining surpluses for the two countries: for country $S$ in the numerator and for country $R$ in the denominator. This ratio, re-scaled by the relative size of the two countries, is equalized to the ratio of the relative bargaining powers. We obtain the typical bargaining property for which a higher bargaining power increases the share of the surplus.

The first order condition with respect to $\delta$ is

$$\frac{\partial V^R(s, p)}{\partial \delta} \mu^R + \frac{\partial V^S(s, p)}{\partial \delta} \mu^S = 0. \quad (32)$$
This condition has a simple intuition: the weighted sum of the (net) marginal benefits from repaying an extra unit of debt must be equal to zero. Equivalently, the marginal cost for the \( R \) country must be equal to the marginal benefit for the \( S \) country. This result is independent of the bargaining weights, but depends on the relative size of the two countries. Denoting with \( \delta^u(s) \) the optimal repayment ratio with renegotiation, we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 5** The unconstrained repayment ratio is strictly bigger with an external bailout, \( \delta^u(s) > \delta^u(s) \). The domestic bailout transfer \( \tau^d \) is strictly smaller with an external bailout.

**Proof.** Appendix E.

Through negotiation, the choice of the repayment ratio internalizes the macroeconomic spillovers associated with a lower repayment (see eq. (32)). This leads to higher repayments, which in turn allows the safe country to reduce the domestic bailout needed to sustain the same level of entrepreneurs’ wealth \( m^S \).

As for the case of debt restructuring without bailout, the solution to the bargaining problem could be at the corner. We can then write the general solution as

\[
g^d(s) = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \delta^u(s) , 0 \right\} , 1 \right\}.
\]

(33)

Note that the solution under renegotiation is constrained efficient as it is equivalent to the allocation chosen by a benevolent planner that faces the same instruments \((\tau^e \geq 0, \tau^d \geq 0, \text{and } 0 \leq \delta \leq 1)\) and the same utility weight \((0 < \Psi < 1 \text{ for entrepreneurs})\). The proof is provided in Appendix F.

### 5.3 Domestic bailout vs. external bailout

Provided that \( g^d = 1 \), the safe country can choose whether to bail out the risky country. This raises the question of whether the external bailout is preferred to a domestic bailout: Rather than making a transfer to the risky country in exchange for a higher repayment, the safe country could limit the macroeconomic consequences of default by making a higher transfer directly to its own entrepreneurs. The answer is provided by the following proposition.

**Proposition 6** Country \( S \) is never worse off with an external bailout compared to a domestic bailout only.

**Proof.** Consider the debt restructuring problem without bailout. The equilibrium repayment is \( g^d(s) \) and the domestic transfer is \( g^r(s) \). These are also feasible solutions in the bargaining problem. In fact, with this solution the two countries would get exactly their reservation values. Therefore, country \( S \) cannot do worse than with an external bailout. In general, it will do strictly better provided that \( \eta > 0 \).
Although an external bailout cannot be worse than a domestic bailout, this does not mean that it will be strictly better. What are the conditions under which an external bailout brings higher welfare to both countries? This depends on many variables including productivities, the stocks of debt, and portfolios’ composition. A full characterization conditional on all these variables is very complex. Here, we focus on the special case in which countries have the same productivity and the same portfolio holdings.

**Proposition 7** Let \( z^S = z^R = z \) and \( \sigma^S = \sigma^R \equiv \sigma = \frac{1}{2} \). Given \( B^R > 0 \), there exist \( \bar{B}^S > B^S \geq 0 \) such the renegotiation outcome is characterized by \( \tau^d = 0 \) and \( \tau^e > 0 \) and both countries experience higher welfare if and only if \( B^S \in (B^S, \bar{B}^S) \).

**Proof.** See Appendix G.

The proposition states that, for given debt issued by country \( R \), renegotiation takes place only if the debt of country \( S \) is within a non-empty interval. When \( B^S \) is large, even if country \( R \) defaults and repays zero, entrepreneurs in country \( S \) have still plenty of liquidity so that a bailout (domestic or external) would not increase welfare. When \( B^S \) is very small, country \( R \) does not have an incentive to default and will repay the debt in full. Notice that, if \( B^R \) is large, the lower bound for \( B^S \) could be negative. Although the proposition is stated under the condition that the two countries have the same productivity and the same portfolio holdings, we show in the next section that this is also the case in the calibrated version of the infinite horizon economy where countries are not symmetric in productivity and portfolio holdings.

Another property stated in the proposition is that, under renegotiation, the domestic transfer \( \tau^d \) is zero while the external transfer \( \tau^e \) is positive. This means that country \( S \) prefers an external bailout to a domestic bailout. Why is that? The reason is that an external bailout brings macroeconomic benefits also to the debtor country. Because of this, country \( S \) can convince country \( R \) to repay an extra dollar by giving a subsidy that is smaller than the part of the dollar received in repayment by domestic entrepreneurs. In other words, the external bailout is cheaper than a domestic bailout for country \( S \). This is shown in Figure 8 with a numerical example.

The dashed line represents, in absence of external bailout, the transfer that country \( S \) needs to pay to domestic entrepreneurs to cover the losses they incurred as a consequence of default. If the repayment ratio chosen by country \( R \) is \( \delta < 1 \), then \( \tau^d = (1 - \delta)B^{RS} \). This ensures that the wealth of domestic entrepreneurs in country \( S \) remains \( m^S = b^S + b^{RS} \). If \( B^R \) is small, country \( R \) repays the debt in full (\( \delta = 1 \)) and, therefore, the domestic transfer is zero. As \( B^R \) rises, however, the repayment ratio \( \delta \) starts to decrease and the transfer \( \tau^d = (1 - \delta)B^{RS} \) increases.

The solid line represents the external transfer \( \tau^e \) required to induce country \( R \) to fully repay its debt (and assuming \( \tau^d = 0 \)). With the transfer \( \tau^e \) plotted in the graph, country \( R \) is indifferent between defaulting and repaying the debt in full (\( \delta = 1 \)) while receiving the transfer \( \tau^e \). As expected, the external transfer increases with the debt.
of country $R$. As $B^R$ increases, country $R$ has an incentive to repay less. In order to be convinced to repay in full, country $R$ must be compensated with a higher transfer.

The message conveyed by Figure 8 is that, provided that country $R$ has an incentive to default, $\tau^e$ is always smaller than $\tau^d$. Thus, country $S$ can achieve the same outcome with a smaller external transfer than with a domestic transfer. This, together with Proposition 7, is one of the most important findings of this section.

6 Quantitative analysis

The analysis of the one-period model has shown that the debt restructuring properties depend on the initial debt of the two countries. But what determines such debt? In order to answer this question, we need to consider a multi-period version of the model where country $R$’s borrowing is endogenous.

With more than one period, analytical characterizations are not available. Thus, we characterize the equilibrium numerically. For the quantitative application, we consider the infinite horizon model and focus on the European countries that were more directly involved in the 2011-2012 sovereign debt crisis. We think of the risky country $R$ as representative of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), the five countries that experienced the largest increase in interest rate spreads.

Figure 9 shows the debt-to-GDP ratios for the five European countries (left panel) together with the corresponding interest spreads over the period 1999-2019. Although the height of the European debt crisis took place in 2011-2012, borrowing and interest rate spreads started to rise with the global financial crisis. Initially, the patterns of borrowing and spreads were similar among the five European countries. At the height
of the crisis, however, they diverged significantly. While the debt-to-GDP ratio of Greece declined sharply, this was not the case for the other GIIPS countries. Also, the increase in the interest rate spread for Greece was much bigger than for the other GIIPS countries, reaching a peak of over 30 percent. In the language of Mitchener and Trebesch (2021), Greece suffered a sovereign debt crisis with default while the other countries experienced a sovereign debt crisis without default.

![Figure 9: Debt to GDP (left) and Spreads (right) during the European Debt Crisis](image)

The experience of the five European countries provides a case study for the application of our model. In that spirit, we use averages for the GIIPS countries to calibrate the parameters that are specific to country \( R \) in the model. For the parameters that are specific to country \( S \), instead, we use moments for Germany because it is the largest country in Europe, widely regarded as safe. For the purpose of calibration, we use the sample period 1999-2019. The starting year coincides with the introduction of the EURO in 1999, and the most relevant data is available up to 2019.

### 6.1 Calibration

We divide the parameters in four groups. The first group includes parameters that are standard in the macro-economics literature. The second group includes parameters that are more directly related to the financial structure of the economy. The third group contains the parameters that determine the size of the two countries. The fourth and final group contains the residual parameters that need to be calibrated jointly with other parameters. Table 1 lists the parameters with their calibration values.

**Group 1: Standard macro parameters.** These parameters are related to preferences and technology. We start with the inter-temporal discount factor which we set
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>Entrepreneur’s discount factor</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \nu )</td>
<td>Elasticity of labor supply</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>Capital income share in production</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi )</td>
<td>Production cost (depreciation)</td>
<td>0.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho^S )</td>
<td>Probability bailout in crisis</td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_R )</td>
<td>Probability commitment to repay</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta )</td>
<td>Bargaining power share</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \lambda )</td>
<td>Government dis-utility from debt</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu^R )</td>
<td>Relative size country ( R ) (( \mu^S = 1 ))</td>
<td>1.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( z_L, z_H, \rho_z )</td>
<td>Distribution productivity</td>
<td>(0.975, 1.025, 0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( B^S_{Low}, B^S_{High}, \rho_B )</td>
<td>Distribution debt country ( S )</td>
<td>(0.295, 0.369, 0.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To \( \beta = 0.93 \). This implies a return on equity for entrepreneurs of about 7%. We choose a unitary labor supply elasticity, that is, \( \nu = 1 \), which is common in macroeconomics.

The production function is \( y = zm^{\alpha}l^{1-\alpha} \), where \( m \) is financial wealth and \( l \) is the input of labor. The capital income share \( \alpha \) is set to 1/3. Productivity \( z \) follows a symmetric two-state Markov chain with persistent probability of 0.9. The average \( z \) is normalized to 1 and the standard deviation is set to 2.5 percent. The process for productivity is within the range of estimations for linearly detrended TFP.

Production also carries the cost \( \phi m \). The parameter \( \phi \) is important for determining the equilibrium interest rate, which we use as a calibration target. However, since the interest rate depends also on other parameters, we calibrate \( \phi \) jointly with the other parameters included in Group 4.

**Group 2: Parameters related to debt and default.** Debt issued by the safe country follows a symmetric two-state Markov chain, that is, \( B^S_t \in \{B^S_{Low}, B^S_{High}\} \). To calibrate the parameters of this process we use the public debt of Germany. Our measure of public debt is given by general government debt (internal and external), including the debt held by the Central Bank and other public institutions. We include the latter because, indirectly, it also provides liquidity to the system.

The debt-to-GDP ratio for Germany displays relatively slow movements over the sample period 1999-2019. This suggests a high persistence probability for \( B^S_t \) which we set to 0.9. The average over this period is 67% and the standard deviation is 7%. These moments provide us with two targets to calibrate \( B^S_{Low} \) and \( B^S_{High} \). Since in the model the average and standard deviation of the debt-to-output ratio depend on other parameters (due to the endogeneity of output), the two values of \( B^S_t \) are chosen jointly with other parameters included in Group 4.
The probability $\rho^S$ that country $S$ is able to renegotiate ($\rho^S = 1$) is set to 0.75. This is consistent with Figure 2 showing that, in more recent times, the frequency of sovereign debt crises without default is about 75 percent. The probability that country $R$ commits to repay—the parameter $\rho^R$—is calibrated to target a frequency of debt crises of 5%. Although not based on precise empirical observations, the 5% target is within the range of values used in the literature.

In our model, a debt crisis emerges when country $R$ asks for a debt restructuring. Some times this leads to renegotiation (with a calibrated probability $\rho^S = 0.75$) and some times to straight default (with probability $1 - \rho^S = 0.25$). However, country $R$ does not necessarily ask for restructuring every time it has the option to do so. This implies that the frequency of debt crises depends non-trivially on all parameters. Therefore, we calibrate $\rho^R$ jointly with the residual parameters included in group 4.

In absence of data to calibrate the bargaining share parameter $\eta$, we simply set it to the mid value of 0.5. However, we show in the sensitivity analysis conducted in Appendix H that this parameter is not important for the quantitative results.

The welfare weight assigned to entrepreneurs, $\Psi$, is important for determining the haircuts and interest rate spreads. More specifically, the repayment ratio $\delta$ increases with the weight assigned to entrepreneurs. We then set this parameter to target an average spread in crises of 5.46%. This is the GDP-weighted average spread for the GIIPS countries over the period 2009-2013. We use 2009-2013 because the spreads for the GIIPS countries started to rise with the financial crisis and returned to more moderate values after 2013. Since the spread in the model depends also on other parameters, we calibrate $\Psi$ jointly with the other parameters in Group 4.

**Group 3: Relative country size.** Because of general equilibrium effects, the relative size of the two countries plays an important role. This is especially relevant because the choices of borrowing, default, and bailout are made by governments who internalize the general equilibrium effects induced by their decisions.

If we interpret country $S$ as capturing a perfectly integrated rest of the world, the impact of country $R$’s decisions on the world interest rate and on international macroeconomic spillovers would be negligible. However, we should not think of country $S$ as truly representative of the entire rest of the world.

In reality, financial and economic integration is not perfect. Even in today’s highly globalized world, national markets continue to be characterized by strong regional components. An example is the European banking system. In principle, there is perfect capital mobility within the EURO countries. This should induce banks in different EURO countries to hold similar portfolios investments across member states. The 2012 crisis, however, showed that the foreign holding of Greek sovereign debt was concentrated in few European countries, making the economies of these countries more exposed to the Greek sovereign debt crisis.

Whether a bailout is led by the more exposed countries or through a cooperative effort carried out by informal institutions (such as the Paris Club or the London
Club) or via international organizations (such as the IMF, the ECB, the European Commission) is somewhat secondary. What is important is that countries or regions more directly exposed to the sovereign default of a country have the political power to influence negotiations.

Based on these considerations, we should interpret country $S$ as representing the regions that are more exposed to the default of the risky country. But this is endogenous in the model, as the level of exposure is determined by portfolio decisions, which in turn depend on the relative size of the two countries. In particular, our model predicts that, given the debt issued by the two countries, the fraction of country $R$’s debt held by foreign residents increases with the relative size of country $S$. Because of this, we calibrate the relative size $\mu^S/\mu^R$ to target the share of country $R$’s public debt held by non-resident banks, which we set to 44.5%. This is the GDP-weighted average for the five GIIPS countries over the period 1999-2019. Notice that only the relative size matters. Since the share of foreign ownership also depends on other parameters, we calibrate $\mu^S/\mu^R$ jointly with the parameters included in group 4.

**Group 4: Residual parameters calibrated jointly.** At this point we are left with seven parameters: (i) the cost per unit of financial wealth, $\phi$; (ii) low value of safe debt, $B^S_{low}$; (iii) high value of safe debt, $B^S_{High}$; (iv) probability of commitment to repay, $\rho^R$; (v) government weight on entrepreneurs, $\Psi$; (vi) relative size of safe country, $\mu^S/\mu^R$; (vii) government dis-utility from public debt, $\lambda$. We calibrate these parameters to target seven moments: (i) an average interest rate in country $S$ (risk-free rate) of 1.28%; (ii) an average debt-to-output ratio in country $S$ of 67%; (iii) a standard deviation of the debt-to-output ratio in country $S$ of 7%; (iv) an average frequency of debt crises of 5%; (v) an average interest rate spread conditional on a crisis of 5.46%; (vi) an average share of country $R$’s debt held by foreign residents of 44.5%; (vii) an average debt-to-output ratio in country $R$ of 80%. The seven calibration moments in the data and in the model are reported in Table 2. These moments are computed using data from Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and the ECB data Warehouse, as described at the bottom of the tale.

### 6.2 Optimal policies

Country $R$’s decision to borrow at the end of the period, $B^R_{t+1} = \Phi(s_t, p_t)$, is a function of the aggregate states, $s_t$, and governments’ policies $p_t = \Upsilon(s_t)$. We omit the time subscript in the policy function because it is stationary in the infinite horizon.

The top panels of Figure 10 plot $B^R_{t+1}$ as a function of the current debt, $B^R_t$, when country $R$ has commitment to repay ($\rho^R_t = 1$). The commitment to repay affects borrowing since in the event of a debt crisis country $R$ cannot re-optimize its debt. The figure is plotted for the range of values of $B^R$ in the ergodic distribution.

The borrowing policy also depends on the productivity of the two countries, $z^S_t$ and $z^R_t$, and on the debt issued by the safe country, $B^S_t$ and $B^S_{t+1}$. The figure depicts borrowing for different combinations of these states. Since productivity and the debt
Table 2: Calibration moments: data and model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public debt-to-output ratio (Country S)</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation public debt-to-output ratio (Country S)</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debt-to-output ratio (Country R)</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share public debt held by non-residents (Country R)</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real risk-free rate</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread conditional on crisis</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of crises</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data on public debt and GDP are “Bruegel database of sovereign bond holdings developed in Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).” We use general government debt held domestically and abroad, including debt held by the Central Bank and other public institutions. Data is available for the period 1999-2019. The share of public debt held abroad is computed as ‘Non-residents’ debt in percentage of total general debt. The real risk-free interest rate is the long-term nominal interest rate in Germany, 10 years maturity (obtained from the ECB Warehouse) minus the inflation rate computed from changes in the German CPI (obtained from FRED). The spread for the risky countries is the GDP-weighted average difference between the interest rates on 10-year bonds for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and the 10-year bonds interest rate for Germany. The ‘Spread conditional on crisis’ is computed as an average over the 2009-2013 period. To compute the moments in the model, we draw a long sequence of random shocks and simulate the model over 110,000 periods. We discard the simulated variables for the first 10,000 periods and calculate the moments as averages of the remaining 100,000 periods. We compute the spread at the beginning of the period conditional on (i) $\varphi^R = 0$, and (ii) country $R$ chooses to trigger a restructuring episode, either with bailout ($\varphi^S = 1$) or without bailout ($\varphi^S = 0$).

of country $S$ can each take two values, we have 16 possible combinations. For readability, however, we only report the states with $z^S_t = z^R_t$ and $B^S_t = B^S_{t+1}$. The left panel is for the case in which the safe debt is low, $B^S_t = B^S_{t+1} = B_{Low}$, whereas the right panel is for the case in which the safe debt is high, $B^S_t = B^S_{t+1} = B_{High}$. Each panel shows the optimal borrowing for low productivity, $z^S_t = z^R_t = z_{Low}$, and high productivity, $z^S_t = z^R_t = z_{High}$. The 45 degree line is also plotted to better visualize whether next period debt is higher or lower than current debt.

There are two properties worth emphasizing. First, next period debt increases with current debt. At some point, the borrowing curve crosses the 45 degree line. This indicates that country $R$ raises its debt when the current value is low and lowers the debt when the current value is high. Second, the optimal debt increases with productivity. This is intuitive since, indirectly, the debt acts as an accumulated input of production. Since productivity is persistent, higher current productivity signals higher future productivity, which increases the incentive to invest. Note that the cyclical dynamics of debt in our model differs from the cyclical properties of a standard sovereign default model such as Arellano (2008). The main role of borrowing in the standard model is to smooth consumption and, therefore, countries borrow more in recessions. In our model, instead, countries borrow more in booms (this does not refer to the debt/GDP ratio, which could could be procyclical or countercyclical).

The bottom panels of Figure 10 display the risk-free interest rate as a function of
country $R$’s debt, when the country has commitment to repay. The new debt chosen by country $R$ is shown in the top panels. The risk-free rate is the interest rate on the debt of country $S$. For any level of productivity, the risk-free rate decreases in the current value of the risky debt. The reason is because when $B_t^R$ is low, the government of country $R$ chooses $B_{t+1}^R > B_t^R$ (see top panels). To induce entrepreneurs to increase the holdings of bonds, the interest rate must rise. On the other hand, when $B_t^R$ is high, the government of country $R$ chooses $B_{t+1}^R < B_t^R$. To induce entrepreneurs to decrease their holdings of bonds, the interest rate must drop.

The dependence of the interest rate on productivity (continuous versus dashed lines) can go in either direction. This is because productivity affects both the demand and supply of bonds. On the one hand, higher productivity raises the entrepreneurs’ demand for bonds because financial wealth becomes more productive. This lowers the interest rate. On the other, the government of country $R$ has more incentive to issue the debt for the same reason that financial wealth becomes more productive. This raises the interest rate. Therefore, whether the equilibrium interest rate is lower or higher depends on whether the change in demand dominates the change in supply. This explains why the interest rate curves cross each other.

The bottom panels of Figure 10 also plot the interest rate spread, that is, the difference between the interest rate on the debt of country $R$ (which is defaultable)
and the interest rate on the debt of country $S$ (which is always repaid). When the safe debt is low (left panel), the interest rate spread is zero. This is because country $R$ finds optimal to repay the debt in the next period even if it has the option to default. When the safe debt $B^S_t$ is high (right panel), country $R$ will choose to default in the next period in absence of commitment to repay, and country $S$ does not offer a bailout. However, the probability that country $R$ has no commitment to repay, coupled with no bailout, is small (less than 2%). This explains why the spread is positive but small.

The variables plotted in Figure 10 are for the case in which country $R$ has commitment to repay, that is, $\rho^R_t = 1$. In the calibrated model this happens with a probability of 90.3%. Figure 11, instead, plots the effective debt haircut when country $R$ can choose to default, that is, $\rho^R_t = 0$. This happens with 10% probability. The effective haircut is calculated as

$$\text{Effective haircut} = 1 - \delta_t + \tau^e_t / B^R_t.$$  

The top panels of Figure 11 are for the case in which country $S$ has flexibility to negotiate a bailout (this happens with probability $\rho^S = 0.75$) while the bottom panels are for the case in which country $S$ is unable to negotiate a bailout with country $R$ (which happens with probability $1 - \rho^S = 0.25$).

**Figure 11:** Effective debt haircut when country $R$ has flexibility.
When the safe debt is low (left panels), the effective haircut is always zero: Even if country $R$ has the ability to restructure, it chooses to fully repay the debt. Next period borrowing, then, is chosen as shown in the top panels of Figure 10.

When the safe debt issued by country $S$ is high (right panels), however, debt restructuring becomes the preferred option for $R$. As we can see from the right panels, the effective haircut is positive and increasing in the debt of the risky country. The haircut under bailout (top-right panel) is positive because the two countries reach an agreement for which country $R$ repays the debt in full ($\delta_t = 1$) in compensation for a bailout transfer $\tau_{t}$ paid by country $S$. Although the repayment ratio $\delta_t$ negotiated by the two countries could be smaller than 1, for the calibrated model it happens to be 1. Thus, the haircut is fully determined by the external transfer $\tau_{t}$. When the effective haircut is positive, the next period debt is simply equal to $B_{t+1}^R = \delta_t B_t^R$.

In the event in which country $S$ cannot negotiate a bailout, the effective haircut derives from a lower repayment, that is, $\delta_t < 1$. As can be seen in the last panel of Figure 11, the haircut increases with the debt of country $R$. We also observe that the haircut is substantially bigger without a bailout.

Why does country $R$ choose to trigger a restructuring episode (inducing a debt crisis) only when the safe debt is high? The intuition is similar to the one described in the one-period model (see Figure 6). When $B^S$ is high, entrepreneurs’ wealth is also high and, therefore, its marginal value in production is lower. In the eventuality of renegotiation, this materializes in a positive bailout transfer from country $S$ to country $R$, while creditors receive full repayment $\delta_t = 1$. Without bailout, the debt crisis leads to outright default with repayment $\delta_t < 1$. A similar logic explains why a debt crisis arises for high values of $B^R$, in addition to the high value of $B^S$.

Figure 12 plots three variables: (1) the probability of a debt crisis; (2) the interest rate spread when country $R$ does not have commitment to repay ($\varrho^R_t = 0$), but before knowing whether country $S$ is able to renegotiate a bailout ($\varrho^S_t$ is still unknown); (3) the interest rate spread when a debt crisis is resolved without bailout ($\varrho^S_t = 0$).

Recall that the commitment to repay $\varrho^R$ is observed first and the ability to bail out $\varrho^S$ is observed after (see Figure 4). A ‘debt crisis’ arises when country $R$ does not have commitment to repay ($\varrho^R_t = 0$) and it chooses to restructure the debt. The probability of a debt crisis is computed before observing $\varrho^R_t$ and $\varrho^S_t$.

The ‘spread with debt crisis’ is the interest rate spread conditional on a debt crisis. This is calculated by solving a hypothetical portfolio problem in which entrepreneurs traded the bonds issued by both countries after observing $\varrho^R_t$ but before observing $\varrho^S_t$. Denoting by $\tilde{q}_t^R$ and $\tilde{q}_t^S$ the prices for the bonds of country $R$ and country $S$ under this hypothetical scenario, the first order conditions for trading return

$$\frac{\tilde{q}_t^S}{\tilde{q}_t^R} = \frac{E_{\varrho^S} \left( \frac{1}{m_t^i} \mid s_t \right)}{E_{\varrho^S} \left( \frac{\delta_t}{m_t^i} \mid s_t \right)},$$

which is the gross spread.
Finally, the ‘spread with default’ is computed conditional on a debt crisis after observing $\varrho^{S}_{t} = 0$. At this point there is no longer uncertainty about repayment. Therefore, the gross spread is just $1/\delta_{t}$ (the inverse of the haircut).

![Figure 12: Probability of debt crises and interest rate spreads.](image)

Figure 12: Probability of debt crises and interest rate spreads.

Consistently with the previous discussion based on Figure 11, the probability of a debt crisis becomes positive for high values of debt in both countries. The spreads also rise with the debt of country $R$ since a lower fraction will be repaid. Importantly, debt crises emerge only when the safe debt is high (right panels), that is, when there is high worldwide liquidity. We also observe that the spread is higher in recessions, that is, when productivity is low. When the safe debt is low (left panels), the probability of a debt crisis is basically zero. When the safe debt is high (right-hand-side panels), it becomes optimal for country $R$ to restructure the debt even if country $S$ is unable to offer a bailout. It is possible then for creditors to receive a lower repayment (in absence of a bailout). This explains why the spread becomes positive. The reason the spread increases with $B_{t}^{R}$ is because the repayment fraction $\delta_{t}$ declines with $B_{t}^{R}$.

### 6.2.1 Anticipated bailouts and borrowing

To show the importance of debt renegotiation for equilibrium borrowing, Figure 13 plots the borrowing policies for the baseline model (top panels) along with the borrowing policies for an alternative economy where there are no bailouts (bottom panels).
This is obtained by imposing $\rho^S = 0$ and all debt crises end up in default. Country $S$, though, could still implement a domestic bailout in the event of default.

Comparing the top panels of Figure 13 (baseline model with $\rho^S = 0.75$) with the bottom panels (alternative model with $\rho^S = 0$), we see that the optimal borrowing without bailout is always smaller than with external bailout. The prospect of renegotiation, which would allow country $R$ to extract some bailout transfers from country $S$, increases the incentive to borrow. We can then infer that the average debt in the environment with bailout will be higher than in the environment without bailout. In addition, since in absence of bailouts debt crises are resolved with default, the repayment $\delta_t$ is smaller than 1. This is also a feature of the baseline model when $\rho^S = 0$. However, in the baseline model this happens only with a probability of 25%. The higher frequency of $\delta_t < 1$ also contributes to lower the average debt of country $R$.

Table 3 reports the average values of some variables generated by simulating the model with external bailout ($\rho^S = 0.75$) and without external bailout ($\rho^S = 0$).

An important result is that the average debt is higher in the baseline model with bailout. The average debt-to-output ratio issued by country $R$ is 79.78% in the economy with bailout and 74.93% in the economy without bailout. This is to be expected given the borrowing policies shown in Figure 13. Furthermore, in the environment with bailout, the repayment $\delta_t$ is equal to 1 with 75% probability after a
Table 3: Average statistics over ergodic distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>With bailout ($\rho^S = 0.75$)</th>
<th>Without bailout ($\rho^S = 0$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt-to-output ratio country $S$ (in %)</td>
<td>67.24</td>
<td>68.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt-to-output ratio country $R$ (in %)</td>
<td>79.78</td>
<td>74.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate country $S$ (in %)</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate country $R$ (in %)</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional repayment ratio (in %)</td>
<td>99.75</td>
<td>99.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External transfers $\tau^e$ (% of $Y^S$ conditional on bailout)</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic transfers $\tau^d$ (% of $Y^S$ conditional on default)</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>6.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability debt crisis (in %)</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread conditional on debt crisis (in %)</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>19.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread conditional on default (no bailout) (in %)</td>
<td>26.57</td>
<td>19.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output country $S$</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output country $R$</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

debt crisis. Instead, in the model without bailout, the repayment $\delta_t$ is always smaller than 1 after a debt crisis.

Because the repayment is lower without bailout, we can see a significant difference between the average interest rate for the debt of country $S$ (the safe country) and for the debt of country $R$ (the risky country). Conditional on a debt crisis, the spread between the two countries becomes 19.61 percent. In contrast, it was only 5.44 percent when bailouts were possible (with 75% probability). The difference arises because all crises are resolved with default when $\rho^S = 0$, whereas in the baseline model default can be averted in 75% of debt crises.

The higher average debt in the economy with bailout facilitates higher production. The last two rows of Table 3 show that the average output in the economy with bailout is about 2 percent higher than in the economy without bailout. As we will see in the next subsection, this could explain why committing not to bail out country $R$ could reduce welfare in both countries.

6.2.2 Ex-ante optimality of bailouts

The equilibrium properties discussed so far show that the expectation of bailouts leads to higher borrowing from country $R$. The higher borrowing is encouraged by the expectation of transfers that country $S$ will make to country $R$. After a debt crisis arises, that is, after country $R$ asks for the restructuring of the debt, external bailouts are always optimal. Are they optimal also ex-ante?

Suppose that country $S$ commits permanently, at time $t = 0$, not to bail out country $R$. This is equivalent to the environment with $\rho^S = 0$. Is the welfare of
country $S$ higher with commitment? What is the welfare impact on country $R$?

Denote by $V^i(s_0; NoBail)$ country $i$’s welfare at time $t = 0$ when the government of country $S$ commits to never bail out country $R$. Similarly, denote by $V^i(s_0; Bail)$ country $i$’s welfare when the government of country $S$ has the ability to bail out country $R$ with probability $\rho^S = 0.75$ at any time $t \geq 0$. This is the baseline calibration for $\rho^S$. The welfare gain from committing to never bail out is calculated as the proportional increase in consumption in the equilibrium allocation with bailout, that equalizes the government welfare in the two environments.

More specifically, denote by $\hat{V}^i(s_0; Bail, \alpha)$ the government welfare when the consumption allocation with bailout is proportionally increased by $\alpha$. The proportional increase $\alpha$ is for both entrepreneurs and workers, and in all periods and contingencies. The welfare gain from committing not to bail out is then the value of $\alpha$ that satisfies $V^i(s_0; NoBail) = \hat{V}^i(s_0; Bail, \alpha)$. If $\alpha > 0$, the welfare of country $i$ is higher when country $S$ commits not to bail out country $R$. If $\alpha < 0$ then the commitment of country $S$ is welfare reducing for country $i$.\(^{17}\)

Figure 14 plots the welfare gains in percentage of lifetime consumption for different initial states. Each plot shows the dependence of welfare from the initial debt issued by country $R$, separately for different productivities and different initial values of debt issued by country $S$. The plotted range for the initial debt $B_R^0$ combines the ergodic sets of the two environments (with and without bailout). Therefore, independently of the environment, if the initial debt is within the plotted range, it will remain in that range. The left panels plot the welfare numbers for country $S$ and the right panels for country $R$. In the top panels country $R$ is initially committed to repay ($\varrho_1^R = 0$), while in the bottom panels country $R$ does not have the commitment initially.

As can be seen, the welfare gains are always negative independently of the initial states. Therefore, the commitment of country $S$ to never bail out country $R$ has negative welfare consequences for both countries. The welfare losses change with the initial states when the commitment is decided (time zero). On average, however, they are about 0.5 percent of consumption.

Although the finding that the welfare effects for country $R$ are negative was to be expected, the finding that country $S$ also incurs welfare losses is more subtle. It derives from the fact that, without external bailouts, the debt issued by country $R$ is lower (see Table 3). There are two reasons for this. First, when country $R$ chooses the optimal borrowing, it ignores the benefits that higher debt brings to the other country. Part of the debt issued by country $R$ will be purchased by entrepreneurs in country $S$ which allows for higher and more efficient production also in country $S$. The anticipation of bailouts increases country $R$’s incentive to issue debt and this

\[^{17}\text{The welfare gain for country } i \in \{S,R\} \text{ is equal to}
\]

$$
\alpha = \frac{(1 - \beta) [V^i(s_0; NoBail) - V^i(s_0; Bail)]}{\Psi + (1 - \Psi)(1 - \beta)E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} c^w_t},
$$

where $c^w_t$ is the consumption of workers in the equilibrium allocation with bailouts.
could have positive welfare consequences.

The second reason is that, in states in which country $R$ has the ability to default, the repayment of the debt is lower. This is equivalent to a destruction of financial wealth that takes time to be rebuilt. Even if country $S$ can avoid the macroeconomic cost of default with a domestic bailout, the future wealth of its own entrepreneurs will be smaller in general equilibrium. Also, for country $S$, the domestic bailout is less beneficial than an external bailout.

We conclude this section by pointing out that the signs of the welfare effects depend on parameter values. A different calibration might change the signs of the welfare numbers. However, in Appendix H we conduct a sensitivity analysis and show that the signs are quite robust to moderate variations in parameter values.

6.3 The dynamics of the EURO crisis

In this subsection we simulate the model over the period 1999-2013 to assess how the European debt crisis was affected by the pre-crisis dynamics. We pay special attention to the dynamics of the safe debt. We choose 2013 as the ending period because, by then, the interest rate spreads for the four European countries that did not default (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) had declined significantly.

The exogenous sources of fluctuation are the productivity shocks, $z_t^S$ and $z_t^R$, the
debt issued by the safe country, \( B_t^S \), the commitment to repay for the risky country, \( \varrho_t^R \), and the bailout ability of the safe country, \( \varrho_t^S \). The simulation is based on a particular sequence of the exogenous states that reflect the observed dynamics during the simulation period 1999-2013.

- **Productivity**, \( z_t^i \): European countries experienced a decline in productivity starting with the great recession in 2009. Since productivity takes only two values, for both countries we assign the high value \( z_{High} \) during the pre-crisis period 1999-2008, and the low value \( z_{Low} \) during the crisis period 2009-2013.

- **Commitment to repay**, \( \varrho_t^R \): Until the financial crisis, there were not significant signs of a debt crisis in Europe. Therefore, for the pre-crisis period 1999-2008 we set \( \varrho_t^R = 1 \). Around the great recession, however, the spreads for the GIIPS countries started to increase, suggesting that the market started to worry about repayment. Based on this, we set \( \varrho_t^R = 0 \) in 2009-2013.

- **Bailout ability**, \( \varrho_t^S \): We consider two cases. In the first case we assume that country \( S \) is always able to offer a bailout, that is, \( \varrho_t^S = 1 \), over the whole simulation period. We interpret this case as capturing the experience of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These countries experienced debt difficulties with significant increases in interest rate spreads. However, they received financial support and, ultimately, they did not default.

In the second case we assume that country \( S \) has the ability to offer a bailout (\( \varrho_t^S = 1 \)) until 2010. However, in the last three years, 2011-2013, it was unable to offer a bailout, that is, \( \varrho_t^S = 0 \). This case captures the experience of Greece.

- **Safe debt**, \( B_t^S \): Given the centrality of Germany as issuer of safe bonds in Europe, we use its public debt to set the exogenous sequence of country \( S \)’s debt, \( B_t^S \).

Figure 15 plots the debt-to-GDP ratio of Germany during 1999-2013 (continuous line) and shows that this ratio increased from slightly below 60% to about 70% during the pre-crisis period 1999-2008. Based on this, we assume that the debt of the safe country, \( B_t^S \), increases gradually during the 1999-2008 period and then it stays at the high level for the remaining simulation period, 2009-2013.\(^{18}\)

- **Initial risky debt**, \( B_{1999}^R \): Public debt in the risky country is endogenous and responds to shocks. However, we need to initialize its value in the first simulation period, that is, 1999. We set the initial value to the limiting value of \( B_t^R \) when the shocks remain at the 1999 levels for many periods.

\(^{18}\)Since in the calibrated model \( B_t^S \) can take only two values, the way we generate a gradual increase in safe debt is by repeating the simulation many times. In each simulation we draw \( B_t^S = B_{Low}^S \) with probability \( p_t \), and \( B_t^S = B_{High}^S \) with probability \( 1 - p_t \). Thus, the expected value of the safe debt is \( p_t B_{Low}^S + (1 - p_t) B_{High}^S \). We then choose the probability \( p_t \) in each simulation year to generate the desired increase in average debt.
Although in a stylized fashion, the goal of the engineered sequence of shocks is to assess whether the model replicates the overall macroeconomic and financial experience of the periphery countries in Europe. The shocks are plotted in the top panels of Figures 16 and 17. The responses of the endogenous variables are shown in the middle panels.

The only difference between the two figures is the ability of country $S$ to negotiate a bailout. In Figure 16, country $S$ is always able to bail out country $R$. In Figure 17, instead, country $S$ is unable to bail out country $R$ in the last three years of the simulation. As mentioned, this is meant to differentiate the experience of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain from the experience of Greece.

Let’s focus first on Figure 16. Looking at the panels in the second row, we see that the debt-to-output ratio of country $R$ decreases endogenously in the pre-crisis period. This follows from the optimal response of country $R$’s borrowing to the exogenous increase in the debt of country $S$: since the higher $B^S_t$ provides more financial assets also to country $R$, there is less need to issue $B^R_t$. The same pattern is observed in the data for the GIIPS countries (see dashed line in Figure 15).

The arrival of the crisis in 2009 is associated with an increase in the debt-to-output ratio. This is mostly due to the output decline caused by the drop in productivity, which is the denominator in the debt-to-output ratio. Overall, this captures the dynamics of debt observed in the data for the average of the GIIPS countries as shown in Figure 15.

The fact that starting in 2009 these countries have no longer the commitment to repay the debt is important in two dimensions. First, the restructuring of the debt without defaulting implies that their debt remains high in subsequent years. The drop in productivity then increases the debt-to-output ratio. Second, the fact that they no longer have the commitment to repay implies that the market anticipates the possibility of default with some probability. This increases the interest rate spread.
Even though we simulate the model with a deterministic sequence of shocks, they are not anticipated by the market. As we can see from the middle panel in the second row of Figure 16, the interest rate spread raises very quickly starting in 2009. In the data this happens more gradually.

The last plot in the second row of the figure shows that output drops considerably. However, this is driven, almost exclusively, by the drop in productivity. Since the debt crisis is resolved with a bailout, there is no drop in the financial wealth of entrepreneurs. This will be different in the simulation with default shown in Figure 17. But before turning to the next graph, we consider a counterfactual simulation in which we keep the safe debt $B_t^S$ fixed for the entire simulation at its initial value. The corresponding responses are shown in the bottom panels of Figure 16.

We can see that the debt-to-output ratio stays constant in both countries before the crisis. With the crisis the debt ratio increases but this is driven by the drop in output (the denominator of the ratio). What is interesting is the response of the interest rate spread. The increase in spread is now much smaller to the point that we would barely talk about a sovereign debt crisis.

The counterfactual finding highlights the novel mechanism of this paper: when global liquidity increases, the incentive to default also increases. This is especially
noteworthy because in the first simulation the debt of country $R$ is actually smaller before the crisis compared to the counterfactual simulation. Despite the fact that country $R$ has a smaller debt, the increase in the interest rate spread is much bigger. Also notice that the increase in safe debt causes an output boom, something that does not happen when $B^S_t$ is constant. In both cases, however, the drop in output during the crisis is essentially driven by the exogenous drop in productivity since the debt crisis is resolved with a bailout and creditors are fully repaid.

We now consider Figure 17. The shocks are identical to those used in Figure 16 with one exception: the ability of country $S$ to bail out country $R$ vanishes in the last three years, 2011-2013. This particular simulation tries to capture what happens when a country like Greece defaults on the debt and there is no bailout.

The dynamics that precedes the crisis is the same as in the previous simulation. However, as the crisis evolves, default leads to a large drop in country $R$’s debt (see first panel in the second row of the figure). The interest rate spread first increases moderately (since at first country $R$ receives a bailout). But then, in the last three years, the spread jumps close to 40%. This is very similar to the spread dynamics we observed for Greece. In addition, the drop in output for country $R$ is much bigger with default than in the previous case without default (Figure 16). This extra drop in production is fully endogenous. It derives from the fact that default destroys financial assets which then causes a reduction in production. Notice that now the drop in output in country $R$ is larger than in country $S$. This is because country $S$ is able to smooth out the drop in entrepreneurial wealth with a domestic bailout.

How would the responses of the economy change if the debt of country $S$ does not increase in the pre-crisis period? The bottom row of Figure 16 shows the responses for the counterfactual simulation in which we keep $B^S_t$ fixed. First, the interest rate spread increases only slightly despite the fact that country $R$ defaults. This is because, upon default, country $R$ finds it optimal to repay a higher share when the safe debt is low. Remarkably, this is the case even though the debt of country $R$ is actually higher in the counterfactual simulation. Second, the drop in output upon default is substantially smaller, especially for the defaulting country $R$. This also shows the importance of global liquidity for the severity of a financial crisis. Even if in our model a debt crisis can emerge only when $g^R_t = 0$, which is exogenous, the magnitude of the crisis (interest rate spreads and aggregate production) is fully endogenous and can be affected by other factors.

7 Conclusion

Many episodes of sovereign debt crisis are not resolved with outright default. Instead, they involve bailout programs negotiated with creditor countries. With these programs, creditor countries incur direct or indirect costs with the purpose of sustaining higher repayments. But why do creditor countries bail out defaulting countries when they could achieve a similar outcome at home by bailing out domestic
banks/businesses? The paper shows that this is because external bailouts are cheaper than domestic bailouts.

Although external bailouts alleviate the macroeconomic costs of default and are efficient ex-post, are they efficient also ex-ante? Would creditor countries benefit by committing not to bailing out defaulting countries? The paper provides a negative answer. This is because the anticipation of bailouts leads to higher issuance of debt, which could be beneficial because it corrects for an externality: in absence of international policy coordination, countries issue too little debt as they fail to internalize the benefits of their debt for other countries. Although we showed this result only with a calibrated model, the finding challenges the view that anticipated bailouts have negative welfare consequences because they create moral hazard problems that lead to excessive borrowing.

Figure 17: European crisis with default: Simulation responses over the period 1999-2013.
A Proof of Lemma 1

The entrepreneurs’ portfolio choice, given policy, solves

\[
\max_{\{d^i_t, R^{R_t+1}, S^{S_t+1}\}} \mathbb{E}_s \left[ \sum_{t=1}^{N} \beta^{t-1} \ln(d^i_t) \right]
\]

subject to

\[
\begin{align*}
    m^i_t &= b^{S_t+1}_t + \delta_t b^{R_t+1}_t,
    
a^i_t &= m^i_t (1 - \phi) + \pi^i_t (m^i_t),
    
d^i_t &= a^i_t - q^S_t b^{S_t+1}_t - q^R_t b^{R_t+1}_t.
\end{align*}
\]

Profits are defined in eq. (4) and can be rewritten more compactly as \( \pi^i_t (m^i_t) = A^i_t m^i_t \), where \( A^i_t = \alpha z^i_t \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha)z^i_t}{\alpha} \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \). Using the profit function \( \pi^i_t (m^i_t) = A^i_t m^i_t \) updated one period forward, we can write the next period net worth of the entrepreneur as

\[
a^i_{t+1} = (1 + A^i_{t+1} - \phi)(b^{S_t+1}_t + \delta_t b^{R_t+1}_t).
\]

The first order conditions with respect to \( b^{S_t+1}_t \) and \( b^{R_t+1}_t \) are

\[
\begin{align*}
    \frac{q^S_t}{d^i_t} &= \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{(1 + A^i_{t+1} - \phi)}{d^i_{t+1}} \right], \\
    \frac{q^R_t}{d^i_t} &= \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{(1 + A^i_{t+1} - \phi) \delta_{t+1}}{d^i_{t+1}} \right].
\end{align*}
\]  

Let’s guess that optimal consumption for the entrepreneur takes the form

\[
d^i_t = (1 - \beta_t) a^i_t,
\]

where \( \beta_t \) is only a function of time. We also guess the optimal portfolio policies,

\[
q^S_t b^{S_t+1}_t = \theta^i_t \beta_t a^i_t \quad \text{and} \quad q^R_t b^{R_t+1}_t = (1 - \theta^i_t) \beta_t a^i_t,
\]

where \( \theta^i_t \) is the fraction of saved wealth, \( \beta_t a^i_t \), that is used to purchase safe bonds. The remaining fraction \( 1 - \theta^i_t \) is used to purchase risky bonds.

Multiplying eq. (34) by \( b^{S_t+1}_t \) and eq. (35) by \( b^{R_t+1}_t \), adding the resulting expressions, and using the equations that define dividends and next period assets, we obtain

\[
\frac{q^S_t b^{S_t+1}_t + q^R_t b^{R_t+1}_t}{(1 - \beta_t) a^i_t} = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta_{t+1}}.
\]

Replacing our guesses for the portfolio policies in eq. (36) yields

\[
\frac{\beta_t (1 - \beta_{t+1})}{(1 - \beta_t) \beta} = 1.
\]
Since $\beta_N = 0$, we can use eq. (37) iteratively to solve for

$$\bar{\beta}_t = \frac{\beta(1 - \beta^{N-t})}{1 - \beta^{N-t+1}}.$$  

This shows that the saving rate $\bar{\beta}_t$ depends only on time, confirming our guess.

We now replace the guess for the consumption policy into eq. (35), to obtain

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\delta_{t+1}}{\theta_{t+1}^R/q_t + (1 - \theta_{t+1}^R)\delta_{t+1}} \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (38)

This condition, together with eq. (37), determines the share of savings invested in safe bonds, the variable $\theta_{t+1}^R$. Since entrepreneurs in both countries receive the same repayment ratio on risky bonds (the variable $\delta_{t+1}$) and they pay the same prices $q_t^S$ and $q_t^R$ (due to free mobility of capital), condition (38) implies that $\theta_{t+1}^S$ must be the same for both countries. In other words, entrepreneurs in both countries choose the same portfolio composition, that is, $\theta_{t+1}^S = \theta_{t+1}^R = \theta_t$.

\section{Government welfare with $N = 1$}

Policies are denoted by the triplet $p = (\delta, \tau_d^d, \tau_d^e)$ and the state of the economy by $s = (z^S, z^R, B^{SS}, B^{SR}, B^{RR}, q^R, q^S)$. The objective of government $i$ is

$$V_i(s, p) = \Psi \ln \left( m^i + \pi^i \right) + (1 - \Psi) \left( w^i \ell^i - \frac{T_i}{\mu^i} - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^i)^{\frac{1 + \nu}{\nu}} \right).$$

Replacing equilibrium wages $w^i$ from eq. (9) into eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain closed-form expressions for labor $\ell^i$ and profits $\pi^i$. Substituting these expressions into the equation above and simplifying, we obtain

$$V_i(s, p) = \Psi \ln \left( m^i + \gamma(z^i)(m^i)^{\tilde{\nu}} \right) + (1 - \Psi) \left( \zeta(z^i)(m^i)^{\tilde{\nu}} - \frac{T_i}{\mu^i} \right), \hspace{1cm} (39)$$

with

$$\tilde{\nu} = \frac{\alpha(1 + \nu)}{1 + \alpha \nu},$$

$$\zeta(z^i) = \frac{1}{1 + \nu} \left[ (1 - \alpha)z^i \right]^{\frac{1 + \nu}{1 + \alpha \nu}},$$

$$\gamma(z^i) = \alpha z^i \left[ (1 - \alpha)z^i \right]^{\frac{\nu(1 - \alpha)}{1 + \alpha \nu}}.$$  

Eq. (39) defines $V_i(s, p)$ as a function of $m^i$ and $T_i$. Eqs. (7) and (8) show that $m^i$ and $T_i$ are functions of $\delta$, $\tau_d^d$ and $\tau_d^e$. Therefore, we can express $V_i(s, p)$ analytically as a function of these three policy variables.
C Proof of Proposition 3

Replace $T^R = \delta B^R$ and $m^R = b^{SR} + \delta b^{RR}$ into the objective function of the government, eq. (39). The resulting function is strictly concave in $\delta$, which we can show by taking the second derivative of the function,

$$\frac{\partial^2 V^R(s, p)}{\partial^2 \delta} = \Psi(b^{RR})^2 \left[ \frac{\gamma(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-2}d^R - \left(1 + \gamma(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-1}\right)^2}{(d^R)^2} \right] +$$

$$+ (1 - \Psi)(b^{RR})^2 \zeta(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-2},$$

where $d^i = m^i + \gamma(z^i)(m^i)^{\tilde{\nu}}$. The negativity of the second derivative follows from the assumption that $\nu > 1$, which in turn implies $\tilde{\nu} < 1$.

Because the objective function is strictly concave, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient to characterize the unconstrained optimum. The FOC is

$$1 + \gamma(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-1} + \tilde{\Psi}(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-1} = \frac{B^R}{B^{RR}},$$

(40)

where $\tilde{\Psi} = \frac{1-\Psi}{\Psi}$.

For analytical convenience we use $m^R = b^{SR} + \delta b^{RR}$ as the optimizing variable. Once we have found the optimal value of $m^R$ we go back to $\delta$.

Assuming that the share $\sigma^R$ is constant, the RHS of (40) becomes

$$RHS = \frac{1}{\sigma^R},$$

which is independent of $m^R$. The LHS of (40) is strictly decreasing in $m^R$, which we can show by differentiation,

$$\frac{\partial LHS}{\partial m^R} = \frac{\gamma(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-2}d^R - \left(1 + \gamma(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-1}\right)^2}{(d^R)^2} + \tilde{\Psi}(z^R)\tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^R)^{\tilde{\nu}-2}.$$ 

Using L’Hopital’s rule, we can show that $\lim_{m^R \to 0} = \infty$ and $\lim_{m^R \to \infty} = 0$. Hence, the unconstrained solution exists and it is unique. The preferred financial wealth depends only on $z^R$, and we denote it by $m^{Ru}(z^R)$. Using $m^R = b^{SR} + \delta b^{RR}$, we get

$$\delta\mu(s) = \left[ m^{Ru}(z^R) - \sigma^S B^S \right] \frac{\mu^R}{\sigma^R B^R},$$

which is a decreasing function of $B^S$ and $B^R$ until it reaches zero. 

50
D Proof of Proposition 4

Replace \( T^S = \delta B^S + \tau^d \mu^S \) and \( m^S = b^{SS} + \delta b^{RS} + \tau^d \) into the objective function of the government, eq. (39). The second derivative of the objective function with respect to \( \tau^d \) is

\[
\frac{\partial^2 V^S(s, p)}{\partial \tau^d^2} = \Psi \left[ \frac{\gamma(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 2} d^S - \left(1 + \gamma(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 1}\right)^2}{(d^S)^2} \right] + (1 - \Psi) \zeta(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 2}.
\]

Because \( \tilde{\nu} < 1 \), the second derivative is negative and, therefore, the objective function is strictly concave in \( \tau^d \).

Because the objective function is strictly concave, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient to characterize the unconstrained optimum. The FOC is,

\[
1 + \frac{\gamma(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 1}}{m^S + \gamma(z^S)(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu}}} + \tilde{\Psi}(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 1} = \tilde{\Psi}.
\]

The RHS of (41) is independent of \( m^S \). The LHS is strictly decreasing in \( m^S \), which we can show by differentiating

\[
\frac{\partial LHS}{\partial m^S} = \frac{\gamma(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 2}}{d^S} - \frac{\left(1 + \gamma(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 1}\right)^2}{(d^S)^2} + \tilde{\Psi}(z^S) \tilde{\nu}(\tilde{\nu} - 1)(m^S)^{\tilde{\nu} - 2}.
\]

Using L’Hopital’s rule, \( \lim_{m^S \to 0} = \infty \) and \( \lim_{m^S \to \infty} = 0 \). Hence, the unconstrained solution exists and is unique. The preferred level of financial wealth, denoted by \( m^{Su}(z^S) \), depends only on \( z^S \). Using \( m^S = b^{SS} + \delta b^{RS} + \tau^d \), and our assumptions about portfolio composition, we obtain

\[
\tau^d(s) = \frac{m^{Su}(z^S)}{\mu^S} - \frac{1}{\mu^S} \left[(1 - \sigma^S) B^S + \delta(1 - \sigma^R) B^R\right].
\]

This shows that the optimal domestic transfer decreases in \( B^R, B^S \), and \( \delta \).

E Proof of Proposition 5

The Nash bargaining problem is

\[
\max_{\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e} \left[V^S(s, p) - \Psi^S(s)\right]^\eta \left[V^R(s, p) - \Psi^R(s)\right]^{1-\eta},
\]

subject to \( \delta \in [0, 1], \tau^d \in [0, (1 - \delta) B^{RS}/\mu^S], \) and \( \tau^e \geq 0 \). The function \( \Psi^i \) is defined in eq. (39).
Financial wealth is equal to
\[ m^S = b^{SS} + \delta b^{RS} + \tau^d \quad \text{and} \quad m^R = b^{SR} + \delta b^{RR}, \]
and taxes are
\[ T^S = B^S + (\tau^d + \tau^e)\mu^S \quad \text{and} \quad T^R = \delta B^R - \tau^e \mu^S. \]

The first order condition with respect to \( \tau^d \) is
\[ \frac{\partial V^S(s, p)}{\partial m^S} = 1 - \Psi. \] (43)

After some algebraic manipulation, this becomes identical to eq. (41). Hence, the unconstrained interior solution for financial wealth in country \( S \) is the same as in the no renegotiation case. Thus, \( m^{Su}(z^S) = m^{Su}(z^S) \).

The first order conditions with respect to \( \tau^e \) and \( \delta \) are given by eqs. (31) and (32). Eq. (32) can be written as
\[ \frac{\partial V^R(s, p)}{\partial m^R} B^{RS} + \frac{\partial V^R(s, p)}{\partial m^R} B^{RR} - (1 - \Psi)B^R = 0. \] (44)

Substituting eq. (43) and noting that \( B^R = B^{RR} + B^{RS} \), we get
\[ \frac{\partial V^R(s, p)}{\partial m^R} = 1 - \Psi. \]

Using the functional form for \( V^R \) and simplifying, we obtain
\[ \frac{1 + \gamma(z^R)\hat{\nu}(m^R)^{\hat{\nu}-1}}{\mu^R + \gamma(z^R)(m^R)^{\hat{\nu}}} + \hat{\Psi}(z^R)\hat{\nu}(m^R)^{\hat{\nu}-1} = \hat{\Psi}. \] (45)

The LHS is the same as in eq. (45), whereas the the RHS is smaller. Since the LHS is decreasing in \( m^R \) and the RHS is independent of it, the solution with renegotiation implies a higher level of preferred financial wealth than in the case without renegotiation. Therefore, \( m^{Ru}(z^R) > m^{Ru}(z^R) \).

Using the definitions of \( m^R \) and \( m^S \), we derive
\[ \hat{\delta}^u(s) = \left[ m^{Ru}(z^R) - \sigma^R \frac{\mu^R}{\sigma^R B^R} \right] \frac{\mu^R}{\sigma^R B^R}, \]
\[ \tau^d(s) = m^{Su}(z^S) - \frac{1}{\mu^S} \left[ (1 - \sigma^S)B^S + \delta^u(s)(1 - \sigma^R)B^R \right]. \] (46)

Since we have already shown that \( m^{Su}(z^S) = m^{Su}(z^S) \) and \( m^{Ru}(z^R) > m^{Ru}(z^R) \), the above equations allow us to establish that \( \hat{\delta}^u(s) > \delta^u(s) \) and \( \tau^d(s) < \tau^d(s) \).
F  Efficiency of bailouts

We show here that the negotiated repayment ratio \( \delta \) and domestic transfer \( \tau^d \) are equal to those chosen by a planner with utility weights \( \Psi \) and \( \mu \). The planner faces the same participation constraints of the two countries, that is, their welfare cannot be smaller than the welfare they can get under default.

The planner’s problem can be written as

\[
\max_{\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e} \eta V^S(s, p) + (1 - \eta) V^R(s, p)
\]

subject to:

\[
V^S(s, p) \geq V^S(s),
\]

\[
V^R(s, p) \geq V^R(s),
\]

with the function \( V^i \) defined in eq. (39). The problem is also subject to \( \delta \in [0, 1], \)

\[
\tau^d \in [0, (1 - \delta) B^{RS}], \quad \text{and} \quad \tau^e \geq 0.
\]

However, we first characterize the unconstrained problem which ignores these constraints.

Define \( \eta \lambda^S \) the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint of country S (first constraint) and \( (1 - \eta) \lambda^R \) the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint of country R (second constraint). The first order condition with respect to \( \delta \) is

\[
\eta (1 + \lambda^S) \frac{\partial V^S(s, p)}{\partial m^S} B^{RS} + (1 - \eta) (1 + \lambda^R) \frac{\partial V^R(s, p)}{\partial m^R} B^{RR} = (1 - \eta)(1 + \lambda^R)(1 - \Psi) B^R.
\]  

(48)

The first order condition with respect to \( \tau^e \) returns

\[
\eta (1 + \lambda^S) = (1 - \eta)(1 + \lambda^R).
\]

Substituting in the first order condition for \( \delta \) we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial V^S(s, p)}{\partial m^S} B^{RS} + \frac{\partial V^R(s, p)}{\partial m^R} B^{RR} = (1 - \Psi) B^R.
\]

(49)

Eq. (48) is exactly the same as condition (44) for the bargaining problem.

We show next that the first order condition for \( \tau^d \) is also the same. In the planner’s problem (47) the first order condition with respect to \( \tau^d \) is

\[
\frac{\partial V^S(s, p)}{\partial m^S} = 1 - \Psi.
\]

(49)

The same condition can be derived by differentiating the bargaining problem (42).

Notice that the first order conditions (48) and (49) do not depend on \( \tau^e \). Since these conditions are identical and they do not depend on \( \tau^e \), the unconstrained solutions will have the same \( \delta \) and \( \tau^d \). The external transfer \( \tau^e \) could differ in the
bargaining solution and in the planner’s solution. However, the transfer does not affect the total surplus but only its distribution between the two countries.

So far we have shown that the unconstrained solutions are equivalent for the bargaining problem (42) and for the planner’s problem (47). Since both problems are subject to the same constraints, also the constrained solutions will be equivalent, except in the distribution of the surplus through $\tau^e$.

\[ \text{G Proof of Proposition 7} \]

When $\sigma^S = \sigma^R = 1/2$, entrepreneurs’ wealth in the two countries is

\begin{align*}
m^S &= \frac{1}{2}(B^S + \delta B^R) + \tau^d, \quad (50) \\
m^R &= \frac{1}{2}(B^S + \delta B^R). \quad (51)
\end{align*}

The proofs of Propositions 3, 4, 5 in Appendices C, D, E, provide the conditions for the optimal entrepreneurs’ wealth $m$ in the environments with default and with renegotiation. In the environment with default, the desired values of $m$ for the two countries are given by conditions (40) and (41). With $\sigma^S = \sigma^R = 1/2$ and $z^S = z^R = z$, these conditions can be written as

\begin{align*}
F(m^S) &= 1, \\
F(m^R) &= 2,
\end{align*}

where the function $F(.)$ is strictly decreasing in $m^i$. We denote by $\underline{m}^S$ and $\underline{m}^R$ the values of entrepreneurs’ wealth that solve these two conditions. The decreasing property of the function $F(.)$ implies that $\underline{m}^S > \underline{m}^R$.

In the environment with renegotiation, the optimal values of entrepreneurs’ wealth for the two countries are both determined by condition (45). With $\sigma^S = \sigma^R = 1/2$ and $z^S = z^R = z$, the conditions for the two countries can be written as

\begin{align*}
F(m^S) &= 1, \\
F(m^R) &= 1,
\end{align*}

and the solutions are denoted by $\overline{m}^S$ and $\overline{m}^R$. Since the conditions are identical for the two countries, we have that $\underline{m}^S = \overline{m}^R$. We also notice that the optimal conditions for country $S$ in the environments with default and with renegotiation are also identical. Therefore, $\underline{m}^S = \overline{m}^S$. In summary, we have that

\[ \underline{m}^R < \underline{m}^S = \overline{m}^S = \overline{m}^R \]

In words, under default, country $R$ prefers a lower $m$ than country $S$. The optimal $m$ for country $S$ is the same under default and under renegotiation. Finally, with
renegotiation the optimal $m$ is the same for the two countries. Once we have the optimal values of $m^i$, the definitions of entrepreneurs’ wealth provided in eqs. (50) and (51) allow us to determine $\delta$ and $\tau^d$.

We are now ready to prove that with renegotiation $\tau^d = 0$. This follows from the fact that $\overline{m}^R = \overline{m}^S$. Eqs. (50) and (51) then imply that $\tau^d$ must be zero.

The next step is to prove that, for given $B^R > 0$, there exists $B^S < \bar{B}^S$ such that renegotiation takes place if and only if $B^S \in (\bar{B}^S, \bar{B}^S)$.

Define $\bar{B}^S = 2\overline{m}^S$. For $B^S \geq \bar{B}^S$, we have that $m^S \geq m^S$ even if the repayment ratio and the domestic transfer are both zero. In fact, we can see from (50) that, if $\delta = \tau^d = 0$, then $m^S = (1/2)B^S$. If $B^S \geq \bar{B}^S$, then $m^S \geq \overline{m}^S$. Country $S$ would like to reduce entrepreneurs’ wealth but that would requires either $\delta < 0$ and/or $\tau^d < 0$, which is not feasible. Therefore, renegotiation can only take place if $B^S < \bar{B}^S = 2\overline{m}^S$.

Now define $\bar{B}^S = 2m^R - B^R$. As long as $B^R > 0$, we have that $\bar{B}^S$ is smaller than $\bar{B}^S = 2m^S$. If $B^S \leq \bar{B}^S$, the (constrained) optimal repayment ratio under default is $\delta^u = 1$. To show this, consider eq. (51). With $\delta = 1$ we have that $m^R = (1/2)(B^S + B^R)$. If $B^S \leq \bar{B}^S$ then $m^R \leq \overline{m}^R$. This means that country $R$ would like to increase $m$ but to do this it has to choose a repayment $\delta > 1$ which is not feasible. Therefore, the constrained repayment ratio under default is $\delta = 1$. Then, given full repayment, there cannot be renegotiation.

So far we have shown that renegotiation can take place only if $B^S \in (\bar{B}^S, \bar{B}^S)$, where $\bar{B}^S = 2m^R - B^R$ and $\bar{B}^S = 2\overline{m}^S$. However, we also need to show that, if $B^S \in (\bar{B}^S, \bar{B}^S)$, then renegotiation will actually take place.

If $B^S > \bar{B}^S$, we have that $m^R > \overline{m}^R$ when $\delta = 1$. This implies that, under default, country $R$ would like to repay a fraction of the debt smaller than 1, that is, $\delta < 1$. Since $m^R < \overline{m}^S$ and $\delta < 1$, renegotiation will take place. With renegotiation, then $m^R = m^S$, which requires a higher repayment ratio.

To complete the proof we have to show that, upon renegotiation, the external transfer is positive, that is, $\tau^e > 0$, and both countries gain. Since $\overline{m}^R \neq m^R$, the first order condition $F(m^R) = 2$ is no longer satisfied for country $R$. In absence of a transfer, then, the welfare of country $R$ would be lower than with default. To convince country $R$ to cooperate, country $S$ has to give a positive transfer $\tau^e$.

The final step of the proof is to show that both countries gain from renegotiating. Let’s notice first that, when $B^S \in (\bar{B}^S, \bar{B}^S)$, the net surplus from renegotiation is positive. The transfer $\tau^e$ will then determine how the net surplus would be split between the two countries. In fact, after fixing $\delta$, $\tau^e$ is a pure transfer from workers in country $S$ to workers in country $R$. Since workers have linear utility and the governments of the two countries assign the same weights $1 - \Psi$ to the utility of workers, $\tau^e$ does not affect the total surplus. We can then find a value of $\tau^e$ that makes the welfare with renegotiation bigger for both countries. The unique value $\tau^e$ is such that country $S$ gets a fraction $\eta$ of the net surplus and country $R$ gets the remaining fraction $1 - \eta$. ■
H Sensitivity analysis

In Section 5 we characterized the properties of the one-period model analytically. However, to establish the ex-ante welfare implications of bailouts we need more than one period so that the debt issued by the risky country is endogenous. Unfortunately, even the simplest extension with only two periods makes the analytical characterization unfeasible. Furthermore, in a two-period model we still have that the initial states, which are important for the welfare results, are somewhat arbitrary since they are not determined within the model. For these reasons, we characterized the dynamic properties quantitatively in the infinite horizon model. With an infinite horizon, we can derive the ergodic distribution of the states and compute the welfare numbers for each of the ergodic states. This is what we did in Subsection 6.2.2.

One limitation of the quantitative analysis is that the results are specific to the particular calibration. Even if the calibrated model predicts that commitment not to bail out reduces welfare for both countries, we cannot claim that this is true for any choice of parameters. In this appendix we conduct a sensitivity analysis to shed some light on the robustness of our results in the neighborhood of the baseline calibration.

Table 4 reports average statistics for some of the variables of interest, after changing one of the parameters. For each parameter we consider two values, one below and one above the baseline calibration. The baseline parameter, reported in Table 1, is around the middle of the two values considered for the sensitivity. The corresponding baseline statistics for the variables of interest are in Table 3.

The first parameter we change is the relative size of the risky country, $\mu^R$ (with $\mu^S$ normalized to 1). A larger size of country $R$ makes commitment not to renegotiate less costly for both countries. This is because the incentive to default is lower and, therefore, the gains from bailout become smaller.

The dis-utility $\lambda$ decreases the value of bailouts for both countries. To understand why, we should first notice that a higher $\lambda$ lowers the average debt $B^R$. When the risky debt is smaller, country $R$ has less incentive to default and there is less need of bailouts. Thus, the welfare losses from committing not to bail out are smaller.

The third parameter we change is the weight $\Psi$ that the government assigns to entrepreneurs. With a higher $\Psi$, the government gives more value to the utility of entrepreneurs. Since default is costly for entrepreneurs (they get repaid less) while it could be beneficial for workers (they pay less taxes), a higher $\Psi$ reduces the incentive of country $R$ to default. This raises the average debt and makes the economy with and without bailout more similar, which explains why the losses of commitment not to bailout become smaller for country $R$. Country $S$ still loses by committing not to bail out. However, if we keep increasing $\Psi$, we reach a point in which country $R$ never defaults. In that case bailouts become irrelevant for welfare.

When $\Psi$ is small, default is not very costly since governments assign low weight to those who lose from default (entrepreneurs). This implies that the renegotiation surplus is not large. Therefore, country $S$ does not benefit much from renegotiation. The debt of country $R$ drops in absence of bailouts, which reduces welfare. However,
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis - Averages over ergodic distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\mu^R = 1.0$</th>
<th>$\mu^R = 1.5$</th>
<th>$\lambda = 0.12$</th>
<th>$\lambda = 0.16$</th>
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<td>Ball/NoBall</td>
<td>Ball/NoBall</td>
<td>Ball/NoBall</td>
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<td>-0.68%</td>
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it also lowers the interest rate. Since country $S$ has more debt than country $R$ when $\Psi$ is small, the lower interest rate implies that country $S$ has a lower net interest burden on its debt (difference between the interests paid to country $R$ minus the interests that domestic entrepreneurs earn on country $R$’s debt). This explains why country $S$ now benefits from committing not to bail out. The opposite is true for country $R$.

The fourth parameter we change is $\eta$, the bargaining power of the safe country. Comparing the case with $\eta = 0.4$ and $\eta = 0.6$, we can see that this parameter is not important for the results. Although $\eta$ determines the split of the renegotiation surplus, it does not affect significantly the equilibrium debt and the interest spreads.
As expected, country $R$ looses a little when $\eta$ is higher but not that much.

Next we change the probability of commitment to repay for country $R$, the parameter $\rho^R$. When the commitment probability to repay is bigger, debt crises arise less frequently. Therefore, there is less need of bailouts. This explains why the welfare losses from commitment are lower for both countries. In the limiting case with $\rho^R = 1$, commitment not to bailout is irrelevant because debt crises never arise.

The debt issued by the safe country, $B^S$, plays an important role in the model. Since $B^S$ is exogenous, we can conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the average value of the safe debt. We consider 10 percent deviations from the average value in the baseline calibration. Higher values of $B^S$ lower the benefit of bailouts for country $S$ but increases the benefits for country $R$ (making the losses from commitment not to bail out smaller). As $B^S$ increases, country $R$ reduces the issuance of its debt and, therefore, its portfolio becomes safer. This implies that it is not very costly for country $R$ to default and, therefore, it repays less in a debt crisis. Bailouts then, allow for more debt stability which is ex-ante beneficial. At the same time, however, since it is less costly to default for country $R$, the renegotiation surplus is smaller which implies lower gains for country $S$. 

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References


ONLINE APPENDIX
Description of numerical solution

The model has $N$ periods and the timing within a period is shown in Figure 1.

The goal of the numerical procedure is to find the policies

$$p_t = \Upsilon_t(s_t),$$
$$B_{t+1}^R = \Phi_t(s_t, p_t),$$

where $p_t = (\delta_t, \tau_t^S, \tau_t^R)$ and $s_t = (z_t^S, z_t^R, B_t^S, B_t^R, B_t^{SR}, B_t^{RS}, B_t^{RR}, B_{t+1}^S, B_{t+1}^R, \varrho_t, \varrho_t^R)$ and $t = 1, \ldots, N$.

We first use the property of the model stated in Lemma 1 to reduce the sufficient set of state variables. Since entrepreneurs in the two countries choose the same portfolio composition, we replace the four states $B_t^{SS}, B_t^{SR}, B_t^{RS}, B_t^{RR}$ with $\omega_t, B_t^S, B_t^R$, where $\omega_t$ is the share of entrepreneurs wealth in country $S$, that is, $\omega_t = (B_t^{SS} + B_t^{RS})/(B_t^S + B_t^R)$. Once we know $B_t^S, B_t^R, \omega_t$, we can calculate $B_t^{SS}, B_t^{SR}, B_t^{RS}, B_t^{RR}$.

Second, since $\varrho^S$ is irrelevant when $\varrho^R = 1$, we define the combined state

$$\varrho = \begin{cases} 
I, & \text{if } \varrho^R = 1 \quad \text{(Repayment)} \\
II, & \text{if } \varrho^R = 0 \text{ and } \varrho^S = 0 \quad \text{(Repayment or default)} \\
III, & \text{if } \varrho^R = 0 \text{ and } \varrho^S = 1 \quad \text{(Repayment or external bailout)}
\end{cases}$$

In the first state, the debt is always repaid in full. In the second state, the risky country could restructure the debt and, if it chooses to do so, country $S$ cannot renegotiate, in which country $R$ defaults. In the third state, the risky country could restructure the debt and, if it chooses to do so, country $S$ has the ability to renegotiate (through an external bailout). We can then reduce the set of state variables to

$$s_t = (z_t^S, z_t^R, \omega_t, B_t^S, B_t^R, B_{t+1}^S, \varrho_t).$$
Similarly, we will find values of \( \bar{V} \).

We will then find values for \( V \) with all variables at their equilibrium values. Notice that we have used Lemma 1 to substitute entrepreneurs’ consumption \( d^i_t = (1 - \bar{\beta}_t)a^i_t \).

For computational purposes, we rewrite the two value functions as

\[
\begin{align*}
V^S_t(s_t) &= (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^S_t \ell^S_t - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} \left( \ell^S_t \right)^{\frac{1 + \nu}{\nu}} - \frac{B^S_t}{\mu^S} - \tau^d - \tau^e \right] + \bar{V}^S_t(s_t), \\
V^R_t(s_t) &= (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^R_t \ell^R_t - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} \left( \ell^R_t \right)^{\frac{1 + \nu}{\nu}} - \frac{\delta_t B^R_t}{\mu^R} + \frac{\tau^e}{\mu^R} + \frac{q^R_t B^S_{t+1}}{\mu^R} \right] + \bar{V}^R_t(s_t),
\end{align*}
\]

with all variables at their equilibrium values. Notice that we have used Lemma 1 to substitute entrepreneurs’ consumption \( d^i_t = (1 - \bar{\beta}_t)a^i_t \).

The decomposition splits the value function in two components. The function \( \bar{V}^i_t(s_t) \) is the value after the determination of \( p_t \). This function depends on the states \( s_t \). The states \( \omega_t, B^S_t, B^R_t, q_t \) and the policies \( p_t \) are incorporated in the new states \( a^S_t \) and \( a^R_t \). Therefore, \( a^S_t \) and \( a^R_t \) become the new states and we no longer need \( \omega_t, B^S_t, B^R_t, q_t \). This is why the new set of sufficient states is \( \bar{s}_t \) instead of \( s_t \). The reason we make the split is because it allows us to reduce the computational time significantly as we will remark below.

### A Discrete state space

To obtain a numerical representation of the above functions, we create a discrete grid for the states \( B^R, a^S, a^R \). All other states take finite discrete values by assumption. Therefore, from now on, \( s \) and \( \bar{s} \) should be thought as taking values in finite (multidimensional) grids. We will then find values for \( \bar{V}^i_t \) and for the policy variables \( p_t \) and \( B^R_{t+1} \) in the grid for \( s \). Similarly, we will find values of \( \bar{V}^i_t \) in the grid for \( \bar{s} \).
B Backward iteration

Since we have $N$ periods, we solve the model backward starting with the terminal period $t = N$. When solving at a particular time $t$, we use the solutions for $V_{t+1}(s)$ and $p_t = \Upsilon_{t+1}(s)$ we computed in the previous step, except in the terminal period where we have

$$
B_{N+1}^S = 0,
V_{N+1}^i = 0,
p_{N+1} = (0, 0, 0).
$$

We now describe the computational procedure at each time $t = N, N-1, N-2, \ldots, 1$. We first describe the procedure to solve for the financial market equilibrium given the new debt chosen by the risky country, $B_{t+1}^R$. This allows us to derive the function $\hat{V}_t^i(s)$. Then, given the numerical solution for $\hat{V}_t^i(s)$, we describe the procedure to solve for the debt repayment, labor market equilibrium and new borrowing chosen by the risky country. This allows us to find the equilibrium policies $p_t$ and $B_{t+1}^R$, and the associated value function $V_t^i(s)$.

B.1 Solving for financial market equilibrium given $B_{t+1}^R$

For each grid point of the states $\hat{s}_t = (z_t^S, z_t^R, a_t^S, a_t^R, B_{t+1}^S, B_{t+1}^R)$, we want to find the prices of bonds, $q_t^S$ and $q_t^R$, and the portfolio allocation $B_{t+1}^{SS}, B_{t+1}^{SR}, B_{t+1}^{RS}, B_{t+1}^{RR}$. This is done by solving the following nonlinear system of equations:

$$
\begin{align*}
q_t^S B_{t+1}^{SS} &= \theta_t \bar{\beta}_t a_t^S, \\
q_t^R B_{t+1}^{SR} &= (1 - \theta_t) \bar{\beta}_t a_t^S, \\
q_t^S B_{t+1}^{SR} &= \theta_t \bar{\beta}_t a_t^R, \\
q_t^R B_{t+1}^{RR} &= (1 - \theta_t) \bar{\beta}_t a_t^R, \\
1 &= E_t \left\{ \frac{\delta_{t+1}}{(1 - \theta_t)\delta_{t+1} + \theta_t q_t^R/q_t^S} \right\}, \\
B_{t+1}^S &= B_{t+1}^{SS} + B_{t+1}^{SR}, \\
B_{t+1}^R &= B_{t+1}^{RS} + B_{t+1}^{RR}.
\end{align*}
$$

where $\bar{\beta}_t = \frac{\beta - \beta_{N-t+1}}{1 - \beta_{N-t+1}}$.

The first five conditions derive from the optimal portfolio choice of entrepreneurs established in Lemma 1. The last two are the market clearing conditions. The seven equations allow us to solve for the seven unknowns $q_t^S, q_t^R, B_{t+1}^{SS}, B_{t+1}^{SR}, B_{t+1}^{RS}, B_{t+1}^{RR}, \theta_t$, at each grid point for $\hat{s}_t$. We can then compute the wealth share of entrepreneurs in country S as $\omega_{t+1} = (B_{t+1}^{SS} + B_{t+1}^{RS})/(B_{t+1}^{SS} + B_{t+1}^{RR})$. This is one of the endogenous states in the next period. Notice that the fifth condition depends on the next period repayment ratio $\delta_{t+1}$. Therefore, in order to find a solution we need to use the policy function $p_{t+1} = \Upsilon_{t+1}(s_{t+1})$ we derived in the previous step. Also, since the next period states determined by the above conditions, in particular $x_{t+1}$, are not necessarily on the grid point, we use linear interpolations to find intermediate values.
We now have all the elements to compute

\[ \hat{V}_t^i(\tilde{s}) = \Psi \ln \left( (1 - \bar{\beta}_t) a^i_t \right) + (1 - \Psi) \frac{q_t B_{t+1}^i}{\mu^i} - \lambda \frac{B_{t+1}^i}{\mu^i} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t V_{t+1}^i(s'), \]

for any grid point of \( \tilde{s}_t = (z^S_t, z^R_t, a^S_t, a^R_t, B^S_{t+1}, B^R_{t+1}) \). Notice that, to find the current value of this function, we need to use the next period value function \( V_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) \) that we derived in the previous step. Also in this case we use linear interpolation to find intermediate values.

Solving the above system of nonlinear equations numerically is the most computational expensive step. By solving the system only on the grid for \( \tilde{s} \), allows us to speed the whole computational procedure. Instead of solving the system every time we change \( p_t \) and \( B^R_{t+1} \) to find the equilibrium values in the next step, we simply interpolate the function \( \hat{V}_t^i(\tilde{s}_t) \).

### B.2 Solving for repayment policy \( p_t \) and new borrowing \( B^R_{t+1} \)

We first notice that, given the states \( s \), once we know the repayment and bailout policies \( p = (\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e) \), we can determine the residual wealth of entrepreneurs,

\[
\begin{align*}
m^S &= \frac{B^S}{\mu^S} + \delta \frac{B^R}{\mu^S} + \tau^d. \\
m^R &= \frac{B^S}{\mu^R} + \delta \frac{B^R}{\mu^R}.
\end{align*}
\]

This, in turn, allows us to solve for the labor market equilibrium in both countries so that we can determine

\[
\begin{align*}
l^i &= \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha) z^i}{w^i} \right] ^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \frac{\pi}{m^i}, \\
w^i &= (l^i)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}, \\
\pi^i &= \alpha z^i \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha) z^i}{w^i} \right] ^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} m^i, \\
a^i &= (1 - \phi) m^i + \pi^i.
\end{align*}
\]

The values of \( a^S \) and \( a^R \) is what we need to solve for the optimal borrowing of country \( R \) given the repayment policy \( p_t \).

Provided that the debt is fully repaid without bailout, that is, \( p = (1, 0, 0) \), the new borrowing of country \( R \) is determined by the following maximization problem:

\[
\max_{B^R_t} \hat{V}_t^R(\tilde{s}),
\]

where the function \( \hat{V}_t^R(\tilde{s}) \) has been derived above for grid points of the states \( \tilde{s} \). Since we may need to solve this problem for values of \( a^S \) and \( a^R \) that are not necessarily in the grid points for \( \tilde{s} \), we use linear interpolation over these two variables.

The optimal \( B^R_t \) is found with a grid search. However, in order to increase accuracy, the number of grid points we search for the optimal borrowing is bigger than the number of
grid points for the current state \( B^R \). This implies that we need to interpolate the function \( \hat{V}^R_t(\hat{s}) \) also in the \( B^R \) dimension.

We can now solve for the repayment and bailout policy \( p \). In determining this policy, the various problems described below will take into account the impact on country \( R \)'s borrowing, the function \( B^R = \Phi_t(s, p) \).

To derive the repayment policy we have to distinguish three cases associated with the realization of the exogenous state \( \varrho \in \{I, II, III\} \).

a) \( \varrho = I \): Full repayment.
In this case the solution is trivially given by \( p_t = (1, 0, 0) \) and the value function is

\[
V^i(s | \varrho = I) = (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^i \ell^i - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^i)^{\frac{1+\nu}{\nu}} - \frac{B^i}{\mu^i} \right] + \hat{V}^i(\hat{s} | B^R' = \Phi_t(s, (1, 0, 0))).
\]

b) \( \varrho = II \): Repayment or default
For any state \( s \) in the grid, we need to find a solution if country \( R \) chooses to restructure the debt. In this case we need to solve the problem

\[
\max_{\delta \in [0, 1]} (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^R \ell^R - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^R)^{\frac{1+\nu}{\nu}} - \frac{\delta B^R}{\mu^R} \right] + \hat{V}^R_t(\hat{s} | B^R' = \delta B^R),
\]

subject to:

\[
\max_{\tau^d \in [0, (1-\delta)B^R]} (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^S \ell^S - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^S)^{\frac{1+\nu}{\nu}} - \frac{B^S}{\mu^S} - \tau^d \right] + \hat{V}^S_t(\hat{s} | B^R' = \delta B^R).
\]

Here \( \delta \) and \( \tau^d \) are solved sequentially and taking as given the response of next period debt which, in this case, is equal to \( B^R' = \delta B^R \). The two optimization problems are solved using first order conditions together with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for possible corner solutions. We derive the first order conditions with numerical differentiation. Using the solutions for \( \delta \) and \( \tau^d \), we can derive the value for country \( R \) when \( \varrho = II \) and the country chooses to default,

\[
\hat{V}^R_t(s | \varrho = II) = (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^R \ell^R - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^R)^{\frac{1+\nu}{\nu}} - \frac{\delta B^R}{\mu^R} \right] + \hat{V}^R_t(\hat{s} | B^R' = \delta B^R).
\]

Finally, we consider the decision of country \( R \) to repay or default,

\[
\xi = \arg \max_{x \in \{0, 1\}} \left\{ x \cdot V^R_t(s | \varrho = I) + (1 - x) \cdot V^R_t(s | \varrho = II) \right\},
\]

which allows us to determine the value for the two countries

\[
V^i_t(s | \varrho = II) = \xi \cdot V^i_t(s | \varrho = I) + (1 - \xi) \cdot V^i_t(s | \varrho = II).
\]
c) \( \varrho = III \): Repayment or bailout

For any state \( s \) in the grid, we need to find a solution if country \( R \) chooses to restructure the debt and country \( R \) agrees to renegotiate. Since the two countries solve a bargaining problem, we first need to determine the threat values, which are given by \( V_i^T(s|\varrho = II) \), computed in the previous point b).

Define the net renegotiation surpluses of the two countries as

\[
\Delta_i^S(s; p) = (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^S \ell^S - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^S) \frac{1 + \nu}{\mu^S} - \frac{B^S}{\mu^S} - \tau^d - \tau^e \right] + \tilde{V}_i^S(\hat{s}|B^R = \delta B^R) - V^S(s|\varrho = II),
\]

\[
\Delta_i^R(s; p) = (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^R \ell^R - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^R) \frac{1 + \nu}{\mu^R} - \frac{\delta B^R}{\mu^R} + \frac{\tau^e \mu^S}{\mu^R} \right] + \tilde{V}_i^R(\hat{s}|B^R = \delta B^R) - V^R(s|\varrho = II)
\]

To solve for the bargaining outcome we need to solve the problem

\[
\arg \max_{\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e} \left[ \Delta_i^S(s; p) \right]^\eta \left[ \Delta_i^R(s; p) \right]^{1-\eta}.
\]

Since the optimal solution for \( \delta \) and \( \tau^d \) does not depend on \( \tau^e \), we first solve for the repayment ratio and domestic transfer using first order conditions together with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for possible corner solutions. We derive the first order conditions with numerical differentiation. Given the optimal solution for \( \delta \) and \( \tau^d \), we find the value of \( \tau^e \) so that country \( S \) gets a share \( \eta \) of the net total surplus and country \( R \) get the remaining share \( 1 - \eta \). Specifically, given the optimal \( \delta \) and \( \tau^d \), we find \( \tau^e \) so that

\[
\Delta_i^S(s; (\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e)) = \eta \left[ \Delta_i^S(s; (\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e)) + \Delta_i^R(s; (\delta, \tau^d, \tau^e)) \right].
\]

The value when \( \varrho = III \) and country \( R \) chooses to restructure the debt is,

\[
\tilde{V}_i^R(s|\varrho = III) = (1 - \Psi) \left[ w^R \ell^R - \frac{\nu}{1 + \nu} (\ell^R) \frac{1 + \nu}{\mu^R} - \frac{\delta B^R}{\mu^R} + \frac{\tau^e \mu^S}{\mu^R} \right] + \tilde{V}_i^R(\hat{s}|B^R = \delta B^R).
\]

Finally, the decision of country \( R \) to repay or default is determined by,

\[
\xi = \arg \max_{x \in \{0,1\}} \left\{ x \cdot V_i^R(s|\varrho = I) + (1 - x) \cdot V_i^R(s|\varrho = III) \right\},
\]

which allows us to determine the value for the two countries

\[
V_i^T(s|\varrho = III) = \xi \cdot V_i^T(s|\varrho = I) + (1 - \xi) \cdot V_i^T(s|\varrho = III).
\]

We have then determined the value of \( V_i^T(s) \) at any grid point for \( s \), as well as the policy function \( p = \Upsilon_i(s) \). We can then move to the earlier period \( t - 1 \) and continue until we have solved for the initial period \( t = 1 \). When \( N \) is sufficiently large so that the solution at \( t = 1 \) is approximately equal to the solution at \( t = 2 \) for all grid points, the approximate solution for the infinite horizon model is that at \( t = 1 \). We will then use the value function \( V^T(s) = V^T_1(s) \) and policy functions \( \Upsilon(s) = \Upsilon_1(s) \) and \( \Phi(s; p) = \Phi_1(s; p) \) to simulate the infinite horizon model.