

Workshop on Political Economy (JULY 29-31, 2015)

Day 1: July 29th

9:00 - 9:45 am

Majority Voting in a Model of Means Testing, by B. Cardak (La Trobe), G. Glomm (Indiana U), and B. Ravikumar (FRB St Louis)

9:45 - 10:30 am

Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation, by D. Carroll (FRB of Cleveland), E. Young (U Virginia), and J. Dolmas (FRB of Dallas)

10:30 - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

11:00 - 11:45 am

The Value of Constraints on Discretionary Government Policy, by F. Martin (FRB of St Louis)

11:45 - 12:30 am

Monetary Unions in a Political Economy Model of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction, by D. Miller (Federal Reserve Board)

12:30 – 2:00 pm

Lunch Break

2:00 – 2:45 pm

The Limits to Partial Banking Unions: A Political Economy Approach, by D. Foarta (Stanford)

2:45 – 3:30 pm

On the optimal design of a Financial Stability Fund, by A. Abraham (EUI), E. Carceles (Stony Brook University), Y. Liu, and R. Marimon (EUI)

3:30 – 4:15 pm

Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: Cycles of Debt Crisis and Inequality Overhang, by M. Golosov (Princeton), A. Dovis (Penn State), and Ali Shourideh (Wharton)

4:15 – 4:45 pm

Coffee Break

4:45 – 5:30 pm

Time-Consistent Institutional Design, by C. Brendon (Cambridge) and M. Ellison (Oxford)

Day 2: July 30th

9:00 - 9:45 am

Continuous Markov Equilibria with Quasi-Geometric Discounting, by C. Chatterjee (FRB Philadelphia) and B. Eyigungor (FRB Philadelphia)

9:45 - 10:30 am

Dynamic Savings Choices with Wealth-Dependent Time Inconsistency, by D. Cao (Georgetown) and I. Werning (MIT)

10:30 - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

11:00 - 11:45 am

Capital Taxation under Political Constraints, by F. Scheuer (Stanford) and A. Wolitzky (MIT)

11:45 - 12:30 am

A Positive Theory of Tax Reform, by E. Ilzetzki (LSE)

12:30 – 2:00 pm

Lunch Break

2:00 – 2:45 pm

The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects, by E. Dal Bo (Berkley), P. Dal Bo (Brown), and E. Eyster (LSE)

2:45 – 3:30 pm

The Limits of Propaganda: Evidence from Chavez's Venezuela, by B. Knight (Brown) and A. Tribin (Central Bank of Colombia)

3:30 – 4:00 pm

Coffee Break

4:00 – 4:45 pm

Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Asymmetric Information, and Political Environments, by C. Lim (Cornell) and A. Yurukoglu (Stanford)

4:45 – 5:30 pm

Winning by Default: Why is There So Little Competition in Government Procurement?, by K. Kang (Carnegie Mellon U) and R. Miller (Carnegie Mellon U)

6:00 – 9:00 pm

Conference Dinner

Day 3: July 31st

9:00 - 9:45 am

Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons, by R. Harrison (U. Catolica de Chile) and R. Lagunoff (Georgetown)

9:45 - 10:30 am

Private Politics and Public Interest: NGOs, Corporate Campaigns, and Social Welfare, by J. Abito (Wharton), D. Besanko (Kellogg), and D. Diermeier (U Chicago)

10:30 - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

11:00 - 11:45 am

An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition, by T. Dragu (NYU) and X. Fan (NYU)

11:45 - 12:30 am

Single-Issue Campaigns and Multidimensional Politics, by G. Egorov (Kellogg)

12:30 – 2:00 pm

Lunch Break

2:00 – 2:45 pm

Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision: Real versus Formal Authority, by R. Bowen (Stanford), G. Georgiadis (Boston U), and N. Lambert (Stanford)

2:45 – 3:30 pm

Persuasion, Transparency, and Commitment, by T. Feddersen (Kellogg) and R. Gradwohl (Kellogg)

3:30 – 3:45 pm

Coffee Break

3:45 – 4:30 pm

Political Specialization, by B. Guimaraes (Sao Paulo School of Economics) and K. Sheedy (LSE)

4:30 – 5:15 pm

Attacking the Unknown Weapons of a Possible Provocateur: How Intelligence Affects the Strategic Interaction, by A. Jelnov (Hebrew U. of Jerusalem), Y. Tauman (Stony Brook University), and R. Zeckhauser (Harvard Kennedy School).